Summary
While EPA negotiations commenced with all ACP countries in 2002 by the end of 2017 only 28 of 79 ACP governments had signed and ratified EPAs in place. Negotiations to complete regional EPAs in the EAC and West Africa remain stalled by the reluctance of key governments to accede to a regional EPA, with this generating tension within regional integration initiatives. While tariff reduction and elimination commitments vary across agreements in terms of scope and the timetables for implementation, provisions restricting the utilisation of non-tariff trade policy tools are common to all agreement and are likely to have the same effects if rigorously interpreted and applied, despite variations in wording. EU agro-food exporters see the application of non-tariff measures as more important than tariffs in holding back further expansion of EU exports. This is likely to become a growing area of contention in EU-ACP trade relations, since to date the EC has ‘soft peddled’ on this issue in an efforts to complete regional EPA negotiation processes in Africa. Meanwhile the value of ACP preferential access for agro-food exports is being undermined by new EU trade FTA agreement. These effects are likely to further compounded by the Brexit process. ACP efforts to place their structural economic development objectives at the heart of the future ACP-EU Partnership Agreement are being resisted by the EC, with this reflecting and underlying tension between EU agro-food sector export interests and ACP structural development objective sin the agro-food sector.
In November 2018 the EC posted its report on the implementation of free trade area agreements (FTAs) in 2017 (1). The posting of this report was accompanied by the posting of a Commission Staff Working Document which compiled individual report and info sheets on the implementation of the EU’s various FTAs (2). This included fact sheets on all the EPAs concluded with ACP countries. The EC acknowledged that at the end of 2017 some 15 years after the initial launch of economic partnership agreements negotiations with the ACP Group as a whole, EPAs had been signed and ratified with 29 of the 79 ACP member states (2). Of these 29 EPA signatories, 14 were in the Caribbean, 2 in the Pacific and 13 in Africa.
| EPAs implemented in 2017 | EPA partners |
| CARIFORUM | Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago |
| Pacific | Fiji, Papua New Guinea |
| Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) | Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe |
| (SADC) | Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa |
| Central Africa | Cameroon |
| Ghana | Ghana |
| Côte d’Ivoire | Côte d’Ivoire |
Source: EC, ‘Individual reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements’, Commission Staff Working Documents, SWD(2018) 454 final, 31 October 2018 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157473.PDF
In addition the EC highlighted how two additional regional agreements ‘have been negotiated and are awaiting signature and implementation’ (with West Africa and with the East African Customs Union). As the EC has recently noted on 21st September 2018 Mauritania became ‘the 15th West African country to have signed the region-to–region Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union’ (3) (see companion epamonitoring.net article ‘EU Sees Mauritania’s EPA signature as Stepping Stone to an EU-Africa FTA?’, 25 October 2018). In West Africa this left only Nigeria standing apart from the EPA process, a country which accounts for 52% of the population of the West African region and 72% of its GDP.
In East Africa only two of the 6 EAC members have signed and ratified the EPA, with Tanzania retaining serious concerns over the implications for national economic development of the ratification and implementation of the EAC-EU EPA agreement as currently drafted.
The EC analysis maintains ‘numerous instruments, from generous rules of origin to special safeguards, ensure that the EPAs support economic development, export diversification and regional integration in partner countries’ (2).
The EC further claims that ‘while EPAs have some common characteristics, they differ from each other in order to respect the interests and needs of different regions’ (2).
However a review of EPA commitments on the use of non-tariff trade policy tools included in agreements with sub-Saharan African countries, drawn up for ACT Alliance EU office, found that while the wording may differ these provisions were largely similar in terms of their effects on constraining the policy space of African governments in deploying a range of tariff and non-tariff trade policy measures (see detailed annex). This is significant for these non-tariff trade policy measures are commonly deployed in support of national sector development objectives in a wide range of ACP countries.
Beyond these common commitments the most significant differences across the various EPAs relate to:
- the extent of product coverage of the agreement;
- the extent of the use of TRQ restricted access for imports from the EU;
- the start date and the length of the time table for the elimination of tariffs on imports from the EU.
For example under the Cote d’Ivoire-EU EPA the phasing down of tariffs on imports from the EU will not commence until 1st January 2019 (2). This is fully 7 years after the process of eliminating tariffs on EU imports under the EU-South Africa trade agreement was completed (which de facto applied to all SACU members). In Africa this could come to pose serious challenges to efforts to move ahead with the creation of an African Continental FTA, since some of these commitments may need to be reviewed if trade diversion is not to occur.
However it should be noted that one of the most important developments with reference to the value of traditional ACP agro-food sector trade preferences is the EU’s growing proliferation of reciprocal preferential trade agreements with major agricultural exporting advanced developing countries. The Commission Staff Working document includes individual reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements with no less than 32 countries (2), a number of which have recently secured significant improvements in access to the EU market in areas where ACP countries also have export interests.
In some sectors such as bananas this is beginning to impact on the EU market position of ACP exporters. These effects could well be compounded by a further development which is extraneous to the EU-ACP EPA process, namely the UK’s pending withdrawal from the EU on the 29th March 2019 (for the prospects in this regard see companion article ‘UK Withdrawal Agreement Concluded At Negotiators’ Level’, 19 November 2018).
If the UK withdraws from the EU without an agreement being in place on the apportionment of existing bilaterally negotiated banana TRQs between the EU27 and UK markets, then with the UK market accounting for around 20% of total EU28 banana imports, competition for ACP banana exporters on EU27 markets would be proportionally increased, as these expanded $ banana TRQs were focused on a much smaller overall EU market.
This has implications for ACP exports taking place under the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, the Cote d’Ivoire-EU EPA, the Cameroon-EU EPA and the Ghana-EU EPA (for more details on the complexities surrounding is issue and the associated issue of the division of EU WTO agreed TRQs see companion epamonitoring.net articles ‘ACP Banana Sector Concerns Raised in EP Opinion on Apportioning Bilaterally Negotiated EU TRQs within the Brexit Process’, 8 November 2018; ‘EU/UK Proposals for Brexit Related TRQ Apportionment Continues to be Challenged’, 29 October 2018 and ‘EC Seeks Mandate to Negotiate Apportionment of WTO Agreed TRQs’, 14 June 2018).
| Comment and Analysis
Despite the variation in wording perhaps the most important common feature of the various EPAs concluded with ACP countries relate to the provisions dealing with tariff standstill obligations and the deployment of non-tariff trade policy tools, notably those dealing with the ‘Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions’ and ‘National Treatment’. The effects of these provisions are likely to be similar regardless of the variations in the specific wording included in the various EPA texts. The key determining factor will be how the European Commission interprets and seeks to apply these provisions to discipline the use non-tariff trade policy tools by ACP governments. The EC is subject to conflicting pressure in this regard. Non-tariff trade policy tools are commonly used by the EC itself (particularly tariff rate quotas) as a means of managing trade in sensitive agricultural products with major competing suppliers. The EU’s use of TRQs to manage imports cannot be divorced from the maintenance of high EU MFN tariffs, which largely make exporting to the EU commercially non-viable outside of the agreed TRQs. The EU’s common use of quantitative restriction on imports of sensitive products from its major developed and advanced developing country competitors needs to be seen in a context where non-tariff trade policy tools are extensively used by sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific governments in support of national agro-food sector production development programmes. However, EU agro-food exporters see the deployment of these non-tariff trade policy tools as a greater obstacle to the further growth of exports than the application of tariffs. This is particularly the case in regard to exports to rapidly growing African markets. This has seen active lobbying by EU agro-food exporters associations for the systematic removal of these policy measures under all trade agreements concluded by the EU. To date however the EC has been soft peddled the interpretation and implementation of these EPA provisions (particularly in the Caribbean), given the EC’s ongoing desire to complete EPA regional negotiations across Africa. This is of considerable importance since the governments of a number of large target markets in Africa remain reluctant to sign economic partnership agreements in their current form (notably Nigeria which has entirely disengaged from the EPA process, Tanzania and Ethiopia, which has chosen not to engage at all). Currently the % of the total sub-Saharan African population covered by signed and ratified EPAs is only 24%, securing the accession of Nigeria to the West Africa EPA and Tanzania to the EAC, would complete these regional EPA processes and would thereby raise the African population coverage of EU EPAs to 69%. The commonality of the effects of the various EPA provisions is a matter of concern if we consider the state of play in the implementation of the only EU trade agreement where reciprocal tariff commitments have been fully implemented (the SADC-EU EPA). Here we find significant limitations being placed on the ability of governments to curb rising levels of specific agro-food imports from the EU with this having an adverse effect on domestic production development in the countries concerned. This is the case even where concerns arise over unfair EU trading practices and the dumping of surplus EU products at below domestic market prices (see companion epamonitoring.net article ‘Putting the Implementation of the SADC-EU EPA in Context: Factoring in the earlier EU-South Africa TDCA’, 13 December 2018). Closely linked to these underlying concerns are the tensions which the EPA process has generated within regional integration processes. In the EAC and West Africa in particular concerns around the longer term economic implications of EPAs for national structural economic development are greatly complicating regional integration processes. This sits uneasily with the EC’s assertion that it supports ‘regional integration in partner countries’. This being noted to date with rare exceptions (e.g. with the decision from 1st October 2014 to temporarily suspend Kenya’s duty free-quota free (DFQF) access to the EU market linked to the failure of the EAC to collectively conclude the EAC EPA process (4), with this measure being lifted 4 months later (5)) the EC has not so far sought to vigorously interpret and apply in full commitments entered onto by ACP governments. It remains to be seen whether this will continue to be the case under the new EU Commission, particularly if EU Agricultural Commissioner Hogan succeeds in his ambition to become the next EU Trade Commissioner. Similarly the EC’s assertion of how EPAs support economic development and export diversification sits uneasily with the EC’s current position in the post-Cotonou negotiations which rejected ACP calls for the inclusion of the promotion of the structural economic development of ACP countries as a central objective of any future partnership agreement. The EC prefers a commitment to the promotion of inclusive sustainable development. Tis formulation neatly side steps the issue of the power dimension of current EU-ACP economic relationships which can at times hold back the structural economic development of particular product chains and whole sectors. This is particularly the case in the agro-food sector where there are marked tensions between ACP structural economic development objectives and EU export promotion objectives which the reform of the CAP has not only made possible, but also essential to the future economic well-being of the EU agro-food sector. |
Sources:
(1) EC, ‘Report on Implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2017’,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157468.pdf
(2) EC, ‘Individual reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements’, Commission Staff Working Documents, SWD(2018) 454 final, 31 October 2018
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157473.PDF
(3) ) EC, ‘Mauritania signs the regional Economic Partnership Agreement between West Africa and the EU’, 21st September 2018
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1911
(4) EC, Note for Kenyan exporters to the European Union(EU) New trade regime as from 1 October 2014, 1 October 2014
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152809.pdf
(5) The East African, ‘Sigh of relief as Europe gives East Africa four months to sign EPA’, September 10 2016
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Relief-as-Europe-gives-East-Africa-four-months-to-sign-EPA/2558-3376456-hg8m4t/index.html
Annex:
Comparison of African EPA Commitments With Constrain Government Policy Space for the use of Non-Tariff Trade Policy Tools
| Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions |
| SADC EPA
Article 39: ‘Prohibition of quantitative restrictions’ The Parties may apply quantitative restrictions provided such restrictions are applied in conformity with the WTO Agreement.” ESA EPA(1) Article 17: ‘Prohibition of quantitative restrictions’ Except as otherwise specified in Annexes I and II of this Agreement, all prohibitions or restrictions in trade on the importation, exportation or sale for export between the Parties, other than customs duties, taxes, fees and other charges provided for under Article 7, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be eliminated upon the entry into force of this Agreement. No new such measures shall be introduced. EAC EPA(2) Article 19: ‘Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions’. 1. All prohibitions or restrictions on the importation, exportation or sale for exports between the Parties, other than customs duties, taxes, fees and other charges provided for under Article 6, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be eliminated upon the entry into force of this Agreement. No new such measures shall be introduced in trade between the Parties. The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of Title VI of this Part.(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: (a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party; (b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade. West Africa EPA Article 18: ‘Prohibition of quantitative restrictions’ Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 23, 24 and 25, all prohibitions or restrictions on import or export between the Parties, other than customs duties, taxes, fees and other charges provided for under Article 11, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be eliminated upon the entry into force of this Agreement. No new such measures shall be introduced” (4). Central Africa EPA Article 22: ‘Prohibition of quantitative restrictions’ Upon entry into force of this Agreement, all prohibitions or restrictions on imports or exports affecting trade between the two Parties shall be eliminated, apart from the customs duties, taxes, fees and other charges referred to under Article 18 of this Chapter (5), whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures. No new measures may be introduced. The provisions of this Article shall apply without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter of this Agreement on trade defence instruments. |
| National Treatment |
| SADC EPA
Article 40 National treatment on internal taxation and regulation 1. The Parties recognise that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 2. Imported products originating in the other Party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, the Parties shall not otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 3. Imported products originating in the other Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 4. The Parties shall not establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, Parties shall not otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 5. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply. 6. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. 7. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products. 8. The Parties recognise that internal maximum price control measures, even though conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects prejudicial to the interests of Parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, Parties applying such measures shall take account of the interests of exporting Parties with a view to avoiding to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects. 9. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any Party from establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films and meeting the requirements of Article IV of the GATT 1947. ESA EPA Article 18 National treatment on internal taxation and regulation 1. Imported products originating in the other Party shall not be subject, either directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like national products. Moreover, the Parties shall not otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges so as to afford protection to national production. 2. Imported products originating in the other Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like national products in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale ,purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 3. No Party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no Party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations so as to afford protection to national production. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to national producers, including payments to national producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of national products. 5. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations, procedures or practices governing public procurement. 6. The EPA Committee may decide to authorise a Signatory ESA State to depart from the provisions of this Article to promote the establishment of domestic production and protect infant industry. In this respect the development needs of Signatory ESA States and, in particular, the special needs and concerns of ESA LDCs will be taken into account. 7. A list of provisional derogations is attached as Annex III. Such derogations are granted to the interested Signatory ESA States for the periods of time which are set out in the same Annex. EAC EPA Article 20: National treatment on internal taxation and regulation 1. Imported products originating in one Party shall not be subject, either directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products of the other Party. Moreover, the Parties shall not otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges so as to afford protection to their respective production. 2. Imported products originating in one Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products of the other Party in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges, which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the origin of the product. 3.Neither Party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, neither Party shall apply internal quantitative regulations so as to afford protection to their respective production. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to national producers, including payments to national producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of national products. 5. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations, procedures or practices governing public procurement.” West Africa EPA Article 35: National treatment on domestic taxation and regulation 1. Imported products originating in the other Party shall not be subject, either directly or indirectly, to domestic taxes or any other domestic charges in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to similar domestic/national products. Furthermore, the Parties are prohibited from applying any domestic taxes or other domestic charges with the aim of protecting national production. 2. Imported products originating in the other Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to similar domestic/national products in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their sale, their offer for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or their use on the domestic market. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential domestic transportation charges based exclusively on the economic use of means of transport and not on the origin of the product. National treatment on internal taxation and regulation. 3.Neither Party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation should come from domestic sources. Moreover, neither Party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations so as to protect national production. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to national producers, including payments to national producers derived from the proceeds of domestic taxes or charges applied in accordance with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products. 5. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations, procedures or practices governing public procurement. 6. The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of this Agreement relating to trade defence instruments”. Central Africa EPA Article 23: National treatment on internal regulations and taxation 1.Imported products originating in the territory of the other Party shall not be subject, either directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like national products. Moreover, the Parties shall not otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges so as to afford protection to national production. 2.Imported products originating in the territory of the other Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like national products in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the origin of the product. 3.Neither Party shall establish or maintain any internal regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from national sources. Moreover, neither Party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations so as to afford protection to national production. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply. 4 In accordance with Article III.8(b) of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs of 1994 (GATT 1994), the provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to national producers, including payments derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of national products. 5.The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations, procedures or practices governing public procurement. 6.The provisions of this Article shall apply without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter of this Agreement on trade defence instruments. |
| Tariff Standstill Commitments |
| SADC EPA ARTICLE 23: Customs duty
1.A customs duty shall include any duty or charge of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation of goods, including any form of surtax or surcharge, but shall not include any: (a) internal taxes or other internal charges imposed in accordance with Article 40; (b) duty imposed in accordance with Chapter II of PART II ; or (c) fees or other charges imposed in accordance with Article 27. 2.For all products subject to liberalisation, no new customs duties shall be introduced, nor shall those already applied be increased in trade between the Parties as from the entry into force of this Agreement, with the exception of: (a) Paragraphs 7; (b) Paragraph 9; (c) Paragraph 7 of Section A of Part 1 of ANNEX 1; and (d) Paragraph 8 of Section A of ANNEX II.(6) 3. Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, for each product the basic duty to which the tariff reduction commitments set out in this Agreement apply, shall be the Most-Favoured-Nation (‘MFN’) rate of duty applied at the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 4. In cases where the process of tariff reduction does not start at the entry into force of this Agreement, the basic duty to which the tariff reduction commitments set out in this Agreement apply shall be either the rate of duty referred to in paragraph 3, or the MFN rate of duty applied on the starting date of the relevant tariff reduction schedule, whichever is the lower. ….. 7. For those tariff preferences that are expressed as a percentage of the applied MFN rate of duty, if at any moment after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, a Party increases or reduces its applied MFN rate of duty, the rate of duty applied in relation to the other Party shall simultaneously be increased or reduced as long as the margin of preference in accordance with the Party’s Schedule is maintained. 8. For those tariff preferences that are wholly expressed as a fixed rate of duty in this Agreement, if at any moment after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, a Party reduces its applied MFN rate of duty, that reduced rate of duty shall apply in relation to the other Party if and for as long as it is lower than the customs duty fixed rate calculated in accordance with that Party’s Schedule. 9. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to those products excluded from tariff reduction commitments that are denoted by staging category ‘X’ in each Party’s Schedule listed in ANNEX I, II and III respectively. ESA EPA Article 14: Standstill Subject to Article 12, the Parties agree not to increase their applied customs duties on products imported from the other Party (7). EAC EPA Article 12: Standstill 1. The Parties agree not to increase their applied customs duties for products subject to liberalisation under this Agreement, with the exception of measures adopted according to Articles 48, 49 and 50 (8). 2. In order to preserve the prospect for the wider African regional integration processes, the Parties may decide in the EPA Council to modify the level of customs duties stipulated in Annexes II(a), II(b) and II(c), which may be applied to a product originating in the EU upon its importation into the EAC Partner States. The Parties shall ensure that any such modification does not result in an incompatibility of this Agreement with the requirements of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. West Africa EPA “Article 15: Standstill 1.Notwithstanding Articles 23 and 24, no new customs duty on imports shall be introduced on trade between the Parties and those currently applied on trade between the Parties shall not be increased as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 2.Notwithstanding paragraph 1, in the context of the finalisation of the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) common external tariff, Ghana may revise until 31 December 2011 its basic custom duties applying to goods originating in the European Community as long as the general incidence of those duties is not higher than the one of the duties specified in Annex 2’(9). Central Africa EPA Article 21 ‘Customs duties on products originating in the European Community’ 1 For each product, the basic customs duty shall be that specified in Annex III. 2.No new customs duties shall be introduced in trade between the Parties, nor shall those specified in Annex III be increased. 3.Notwithstanding paragraph 2, in the context of introducing a common external tariff as of 1 January 2013 at the latest, and insofar as the general incidence of these duties is no higher than that of the duties specified in Annex III, Central Africa may revise the basic customs duties specified in Annex III which are applicable to products originating in the European Community. In that case, the EPA Committee shall modify Annex III accordingly. |
Notes
(1) All references to the ESA text are based on the interim ESA-EU EPA published in the OJ on 24 April 2012
(2) This remains a proposals for a Council decision, since the agreements is not signed by all parties to the EAC.
(3)Title VI refers to Trade Defence Measures
(4)This text is common to both the Ghana and Ivory Coast EPAs. Articles 23, 24 and 25 deal respectively with ‘anti-dumping and countervailing measures’, ‘multilateral safeguards’, and ‘bilateral safeguards
(5)Article 18 refers to. fees and other charges levied being commensurate with the services provided.
(6) These exceptions relate to: sustainable development objectives including poverty eradication (Paragraphs 7); the right to regulate and levels of environmental and labour protection (Paragraph 9); the specific products excluded form tariff elimination commitments under the agreed schedules for the elimination of tariffs agreed to under the agreement (Paragraph 7 of Section A of Part 1 of ANNEX 1); and the stipulation that ‘Customs duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging category ‘X’ in the SACU Schedule shall be excluded from tariff reduction commitments’ (Paragraph 8 of Section A of ANNEX II).
(7) Article 12 refers to the tariff reduction schedules established under the agreement but makes provision for a review of the schedules ‘with a view to harmonising them taking into account regional integration processes’.
(8) Articles 48,49 and 50 refer respectively to: ‘Anti-dumping and countervailing measures’, ‘Multilateral safeguards’ and ‘Bilateral safeguards’
(9) This provision is common to the Ghanaian and Ivorian EPAs.