Misleading Information on Brexit and the Cocoa Sector Misses the Point on Trade Issues Faced

September 26, 2019September 25, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Misleading information posted on pro-Brexit websites on EU tariffs on African cocoa product exports is distracting attention away from real issues which need to be addressed under a no-deal Brexit scenario if the current strong trend in growth in African exports of value added cocoa products is not to be halted and ever reversed. This includes the importance of the UK government taking urgent steps to avert any disruption of commercial relations arising from the threat of a possible loss of existing duty free access for value added cocoa products to the UK market as a result of the ongoing messy Brexit process. This requires a clear UK government policy commitment to taking whatever steps necessary to ensure continued DFQF access for African value added cocoa product exports. It also requires a clear policy commitment form the UK to: maintaining in place existing MFN tariffs on imports of value added cocoa products; ensuring full pan-African cumulation under the rules of origin applied under any future UK-only trade agreements; the establishment of investment support instruments to facilitate continued movement up the cocoa value chain in Africa to serve the UK. Read more “Misleading Information on Brexit and the Cocoa Sector Misses the Point on Trade Issues Faced”

The EU-Mercosur Agreement Part 3: Will the Mercosur Agreement Pose a Threat to the Stability of EU27 Banana Markets

September 9, 2019August 29, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
EU banana producers have expressed fears over the impact any EU-Mercosur banana tariff concessions could have on the level of banana imports from Brazil. Based on recent trends in EU banana imports in response to tariff reductions these fears have solid foundations. However from an ACP perspective such fears should not be overstated with the likely market effects of increased Brazilian banana exports to the EU needing to be seen in the context of all the wider sources of pressure on the EU market position of ACP banana exporters. Individual ACP banana exporters will need to evaluate the specific implications of any new Mercosur agreement tariff concessions for the particular EU banana market components they serve. Where necessary enhanced marketing and product differentiation strategies will need to be set in place in order to maintain their current export trade to the EU. However, it needs to be recognized this will not be possible for all existing ACP banana exporters. Read more “The EU-Mercosur Agreement Part 3: Will the Mercosur Agreement Pose a Threat to the Stability of EU27 Banana Markets”

Ghanaian Banana Exporters Spell Out Implications of Loss of DFQF Access to UK Market

September 2, 2019August 29, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Failure to ensure a basis for continued DFQF access for Ghanaian banana exports to the UK market could result in the loss of supply agreements as a result of the inclusion of ‘delivered duty paid’ requirements in current UK super market tendering arrangements. The UK government urgently needs to decide upon the basis for providing continued DFQF for Ghanaian exports on an interim basis, while the regional complications around concluding regional West African reciprocal trade agreements, arising from the Nigerian governments reluctance to sign on to such agreement, are resolved. Speedily setting in place the regulatory measures required to ensure continued DFQF access for Ghanaian banana exports can be seen as vital to ensuring successful tenders are made for the current banana supply contracts being placed by UK supermarkets. Read more “Ghanaian Banana Exporters Spell Out Implications of Loss of DFQF Access to UK Market”

The EU-Mercosur Agreement Part 1: Overview and Lessons for the ACP

August 22, 2019August 15, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
The structure of the EU-Mercosur FTA potentially holds important lessons for ACP governments. This is most notably the case in regard to the use of TRQs to carefully manage trade liberalisation in sensitive agro-food sectors. The EU makes extensive use of TRQs under trade agreements with its major agro-food sector trade partners in order to protect the interests of EU farmers, while meeting consumer demand. The contrasts sharply with the use made of TRQs by African governments in trade agreements with their major agro-food sector trade partner, the EU. With the exception of the EU-SADC EPA no other African governments have used TRQs to manage imports from the EU in sensitive agro-food products. In addition the application of tariff standstill commitments to products not subject to tariff reduction commitments under the EU-Mercosur agreement is potentially of concern to ACP governments if this approach is extended to the interpretation and application of EPA commitments. The use of regionalisation arrangements for SPS controls however would usefully be extended to the treatment of certain ACP exports to the EU (e.g. Namibian beef and lamb exports). Finally the ’non-alteration’ rule included in the Mercosur agreement could usefully be taken up and applied in an extended form in the context of a no-deal Brexit under the existing EU-ACP EPAs and rolled over UK-ACP Continuity Agreements. Read more “The EU-Mercosur Agreement Part 1: Overview and Lessons for the ACP”

Commissioner Hogan Highlights Agri-food Sector No Deal Brexit Preparations

August 12, 2019July 20, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
In the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit EU market disturbance mitigation measures will consist of a combination of public intervention buying, aid to private storage, support for product withdrawal schemes, targeted financial assistance and support for the development of alternative markets. These instruments can be combined in various ways in light of sectoral needs, with the EC maintaining its experience of previous market disturbance in the 2014-16 period provides a wealth of experience to draw on. The experience of trade diversion to ACP markets following the August 2014 Russian import embargo is a source of concern for ACP producers. This experience suggests a need for a pro-active ACP engagement with the EC on the design and implementation of EU Brexit-related market disturbance mitigation measures, to ensure such measures take into account the interests of ACP producers and traders. Read more “Commissioner Hogan Highlights Agri-food Sector No Deal Brexit Preparations”

Minimum cocoa price initiative faces challenges

August 8, 2019July 15, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
A June 2019 initiative to establish a minimum price for cocoa beans launched by the Governments of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire faced a set-back in July when no agreement could be reached with chocolate sector representatives on how the new minimum price should be applied in practice. Cocoa farmer’s representatives have stressed the importance of ensuring any such initiative translates into higher farm gate prices for cocoa farmers. Consumer pressure on chocolate companies to fully integrate a living wage for cocoa farmers into the prices paid for cocoa beans and cocoa products is needed if the current impasse is to be overcome. Read more “Minimum cocoa price initiative faces challenges”

New EU Fruit Fly Rules Cause Concern Amongst West African Mango Exporters

August 5, 2019July 28, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Stricter EU SPS import controls on Tephritidae (fruit flies) infestations due to come into effect on 1^st September 2019 could pose challenges for West African mango exports to the EU. This is particularly the case for smaller scale exporters. In this context a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could offer some relief, if the UK could be persuaded to define the required SPS controls with reference solely to the agro-climatic conditions prevailing in the UK rather than across the whole of the EU. This is an issue which concerned ACP exporters should urge their governments to collectively take up with the UK government, with a view to establishing clearly defined structures for dialogue around such a review once the UK is no longer subject to the rules of the EU’s customs union and single market. Read more “New EU Fruit Fly Rules Cause Concern Amongst West African Mango Exporters”

UK Resolve to Leave the EU on 31st October With or Without a Deal Strengthened Through New Cabinet Appointments

August 1, 2019July 27, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Commitments made by Conservative party leadership candidate Boris Johnson to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement to remove the Irish ‘back-stop’ and leave the EU on 31^st October come what may, have been reiterated in his early statements as Prime Minister. This position is reinforced by the appointment of a cabinet consisting of like-minded ‘hard Brexiteers’. While the EU remains committed to avoiding a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, this now hinges around persuading Prime Minister Johnson the invocation of the ‘backstop’ can be avoided and Prime Minister Johnson then mobilising Parliament behind ratification of the existing Withdrawal Agreement, on the understanding joint action on technical solutions will make the backstop irrelevant. Recent history in this regard is not promising. The EC continues to prepare for a ‘no-deal’ scenario; including how to keep dialogue open in the event of the UK’s ‘no-deal’ departure from the EU on 31^st October. Critical to keeping dialogue open will be the UK honouring its financial obligations to the EU, an area where to date Prime Minister Johnson has reiterated his campaign pledge to withhold payment until a new trade framework is agreed. All hope thus lies in either a ‘Boris Back-flip’ before October 31^st, on a basis which holds out to EU leaders some prospect of an eventual negotiated arrangement for the UK’s withdrawal or a general election in which an anti-Brexit coalition secures a firm majority.

During his campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party, Prime Minister Johnson committed any government he led to:

leaving the EU on 31^st October, with or without a deal, with the preferred option being having a withdrawal deal in place;
securing modifications to the Withdrawal Agreement, notably in regard to the Irish ‘backstop’, so as to ensure a deal is in place;
holding back the UK’s payment of the financial settlement of outstanding obligations to the EU if no agreement has been concluded and there is no prospect of new trade arrangement (1).

As a demonstration of the new governments’ resolve Cabinet members have been required to commit unequivocally to leaving the EU on the 31^st October, with those unwilling to make such a commitment leaving or being sacked from the Cabinet. A new wholly ‘hard Brexit’ Cabinet unequivocally committed to leaving the EU on 31^st October is now in place to support Prime Minister Johnson in his party election campaign Brexit pledges (2).

Despite the hard line which Prime Minister Johnson has carried over into the new UK government, EU leaders have committed to continuing to seek an agreement to avert a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. Incoming European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has ascribed a ‘duty’ to both parties to reach an agreement, with this backing up Chancellor Merkels’ resolve to find a way out of the impasse. Ursula von der Leyen has even spoken of the scope for a further extension of the article 50 period, if more time is needed to ensure a Withdrawal Agreement is in place (1).

However EU Chief Negotiator Barnier has clearly stated any constructive discussions with the new UK government to resolve the current impasse will need to be based on cooperation in facilitating ‘the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement’ (1). Even Chancellor Merkel is insisting ‘the withdrawal agreement is the withdrawal agreement’, with any efforts to manage the Irish border issue needing to be addressed in the accompanying Political Declaration. She does however believe there is a way of managing the border in a way which would mean ‘the backstop will be overwritten’ (3).

This is likely to be the critical consideration in avoiding a ‘no-deal’ Brexit since as Irelands’ Deputy Prime Minister Simon Coveney has warned ‘If the approach of the new British prime minister is that they’re going to tear up the withdrawal agreement, I think we’re in trouble’. He went on to note how in this context ‘a no-deal departure would not be the fault of the EU…. but would be entirely down to UK political considerations’ (4).

Against this background a number of lines of approach to the current Brexit impasse are being explored in the EU. The first option focusses on finding a wording which will provide a way for Prime Minister Johnson to declare the backstop will never need to be invoked and therefore the UK Parliament should ratify the Withdrawal Agreement. Unfortunately EC officials are not optimistic. ‘Between December 2018 and March 2019, the EU issued three sets of promises outlining speedy work on a future trade deal to avoid the backstop’. Each of these texts was more elaborate, with the final text including a reference to the initiation of ‘joint work on “alternative arrangements” to avoid a backstop’ (5). This however proved insufficient to convince Tory Eurosceptics to vote for the Withdrawal Agreement under a Theresa May led government. EC officials appear to be hoping Prime Minister Johnson’s unbounded enthusiasm and boyish charm will prove sufficient to swing the dial of Parliamentary support behind the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’; based on the personal assurances of the Prime Minister that he would never let the backstop enter into effect and a shared commitment to working out ‘alternative arrangements’.

The second strand of EC thinking on how to avoid a ‘no-deal’ Brexit hinges around the scepticism with which some EC officials view candidate Johnson’s campaign pledges. These officials take the view a Prime Minister Johnson is perfectly capable of a policy ‘back-flip’ on his “do or die” rhetoric around a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on 31st October. These EC officials have been encouraged by efforts by both the House of Commons and House of Lords to prevent any proroguing of Parliament in order to push through a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on 31st October 2019 (6). It is felt this could facilitate such a policy ‘back-flip’ by Prime Minister Johnson come the end of October. This accounts for the continued openness of the EU to an extension of the Article 50 period.

However it needs to be borne in mind that President Macron is concerned that the continued membership of a reluctant UK is not in the interest of the EU. There is a view in Paris that the economic disruptions which a ‘no-deal’ Brexit would give rise to would be such that the UK would rapidly return to the negotiating table. This view is not universal amongst EU member states governments, particularly those such as Ireland and the Netherlands who would be most directly affected by a no-deal departure. In these quarters there are real fears that public opinion in the UK has been stoked to such a fever pitch that a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could give rise to a ‘Dunkirk‘ mentality (7), where the UK turns its back on the EU and seeks to strike out on its own wholly autonomous global trade policy.

This gives rise to the third avenue the EC is exploring namely, intensifying ‘no-deal’ Brexit preparations. This includes work by some EC officials on what can be done to bridge the abyss in EU27/UK relations which would emerge on the back of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on 31st October 2019. These officials are seeking to work up the basis of a ‘platform for re-engagement on the day the UK leaves which might be used once the dust has settled’. This includes the provisional drafting of a declaration expressing ‘the EU27’s regret at the lack of a deal and offering to re-engage if the UK accepts its financial commitments’ (7).

This strongly suggests any post ‘no-deal’ Brexit reengagement will critically hinge around the UK’s willingness to meet in full its outstanding financial obligations to the EU. Unfortunately this is something Prime Minister Johnson implicitly ruled out in his first public statements as Prime Minister.

These preparations for ‘bridge building’ in the event of a no-deal Brexit on 31^st October have been complicated by the recent politicisation of technical discussions around the maintenance of trade flows. Senior Conservatives have sought to down play the negative effects of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit by arguing the economic damage would be mitigated by the series of side deals with the EU which are already in place (8).

This has infuriated the EC which described these claims as ‘pure-rubbish’. The EC maintains the only measures set in place are temporary and unilateral and in no way constitute mini-deals. Just how temporary such arrangements are is illustrated by the fact the emergency freight haulage arrangement in place is scheduled to lapse at the end of December 2019, only two months after any 31^st October ‘no-deal’ Brexit (8).

Remarks by prominent ‘hard Brexiteers’ who are now in Cabinet to the effect that a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could provide an economic stimulus to the UK economy of ‘in the region of £80 billion’ are not helping the atmosphere for efforts to avoid a no deal Brexit. These comments by Jacob Rees Mogg were described as ‘terrifying’ by the then Chancellor Philip Hammond (9), given the modelling of the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) and analysis from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) that a no-deal Brexit would push the UK economy into a serious recession (10). This would be a result of: heightened uncertainty and declining confidence’, which would ‘deter investment’; ‘higher trade barriers with the EU’, which would ‘weigh on domestic and foreign demand’; a sharp fall in ‘the pound and other asset prices’ (11).

In terms of likely immediate developments, the Guardian reports Prime Minister Johnson is planning to ‘visit key EU capitals in early August’. This is felt by EC officials to be a sensible course of action, since it will allow the new Prime Minister to gauge the mood in EU capitals, in a way which will avert any premature confrontation with the EC which could heighten the risks of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit

The G7 meeting in Biarritz at the end of August is being seen as ‘an important stepping stone to finding a mutually advantageous way forward’ within the Brexit process. This it is hoped would be followed by yet another emergency EU Summit in September which would see a deal set in place and the UK depart the EU on 31^st October 2019 (7).

Against this background the Brexit Secretary Stephen Barclay has suggested this will lead to a situation where Parliament would then be asked to vote on any new deal achieved’, with the options of

rejecting the amended deal;
leaving the EU without a deal;
revoking Brexit (9).

However according to press reports there is now ‘a growing belief in Brussels that Johnson has no intention of negotiating with the EU, but is instead driving forward with a no-deal exit with the understanding that parliament will block him and it will be necessary to call a general election’ (12). This follows on from Prime Minister Johnson refusing to hold further talks with the EU unless the Withdrawal Agreement and the ‘backstop’ are both on the table for review (13).

Provoking an outright confrontation with the EU May be part of Prime Minister’s Johnson’s strategy, with the resulting parliamentary deadlock and general election allowing him to campaign as the only “True Brit” capable of taking on the evil machinations of Brussels. Since a jingoistic election campaign could then see of the threat of the Brexit Party and see a Johnson led government returned to power with the necessary parliamentary majority to see through the Prime Ministers version of Brexit. However this is a high risk strategy with the possibility of the Brexit Party splitting the pro-Brexit vote and a Labour/Liberal Alliance securing a sufficient majority to halt Brexit altogether.

Comment and Analysis

There remains profound uncertainty over what will happen come the 31^st October. This uncertainty is complicating the commercial relations of ACP exporters in their dealings with the UK and EU27. There are 5 principal areas of uncertainty which are of concern to ACP exporters:

· uncertainty over the basis for tariff treatment of ACP exports to the UK, given the lapsing of EU trade agreements in regard to the territory of the UK in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit;

· uncertainty as to the value of the £ in the immediate post ‘no-deal’ Brexit period given projections of a potential 10% devaluation of the £ against the $ under a ‘no-deal’ scenario;

· uncertainty over the specific market conditions which will be created for particular ACP agro-food exports under a ‘no-deal’ Brexit;

· uncertainty over the efficiency of UK trade administration arrangements for preferential imports under a ‘no-deal’ Brexit scenario;

· uncertainty over the administration arrangements to be applied along triangular supply chains serving the UK market via initial points of landing in EU27 countries, particularly in the floriculture and horticulture sectors.

Current Tariff Treatment for Exports to the UK Market
Each of these areas of uncertainty can be addressed to varying degrees. In terms of ensuring continuity of current tariff treatment for exports to the UK market the position of LDCs is secure, while 21 ACP governments have already signed Continuity Agreements with the UK which would enter into effect in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit (see table 1).

Table 1: EPAs Rolled Over	EPA partners
EU-CARIFORUM EPA	Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti
EU-Pacific EPA	Fiji, Papua New Guinea
EU-Eastern & Southern Africa (ESA) EPA	Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe

Talks on the ‘rolling over’ of the SADC-EU EPA and bilateral EPAs concluded with individual west African and central African countries into UK only ‘Continuity Agreements’ remain on ongoing. Uncertainty around the prospects for successfully concluding these negotiations primarily affects exporters from Kenya, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Botswana, Namibia, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), and South Africa. ACP exporters from these countries need to lobby their governments to conclude Continuity Agreements or similar such arrangements which preserve current duty free-quota free access to the UK market from 1^st November 2019.

However it needs to be recognised that particular challenges face the governments of Kenya, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon given the partial nature of the EPA process in the East African, West African and Central Africa regions. Concluding ‘Continuity Agreements’ with the UK would further complicate intra-regional trade relations in these regions, with this problem being particularly acute in the East Africa Customs Union, where it could trigger a collapse of this increasingly fragile regional integration initiative.

Table 2: On-Going Continuity Agreement Negotiations
EU-SADC EPA Group	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Mozambique
Problematical EPA Process Countries
EU-EAC EPA	Kenya
EU-Central Africa	Cameroon
EU-Ghana & EU-Ivory Coast EPAs	Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire

Against this background the UK government needs to be lobbied to:

• adopt the same type of Market Access Regulation (MAR) approach which the EU has retained in place for Kenya, with this being extended to Cameroon, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire so as to minimise frictions within African regional trade integration initiatives, this could be achieved without triggering a WTO challenge;

• if, necessary this option should also be applied to imports from Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa.

The Prospect of a Devaluation of the £
Recent analysis suggests a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could give rise to a 10% reduction in the value of the £ against the US $. ACP exporters will need to explore options for hedging their currency transactions against devaluations or denominating exports in $ or € in trade with the UK beyond 1^st November 2019. If this is not possible they should review whether, in light of other potential cost increasing effects of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, exports to the UK market are likely to remain commercially viable beyond 1st November 2019

Reviewing the Specific Market Effects of a No-Deal’ Brexit for Particular ACP Exports
How the UK withdraws from the EU will have an impact on how markets of interest to ACP exporters will be affected. For example, a no-deal Brexit will remove 550,000 tonnes of EU white sugar from the UK market. This is equivalent to around 25% of UK consumption and as a consequence is likely to have a significant impact on UK sugar prices in the immediate post-Brexit period. This could bring immediate benefits to ACP sugar exporters that can reconsolidate their current duty free-quota free access to the UK market for the immediate post-Brexit period (see accompanying epamonitoring.net article ‘Low EU sugar prices lead to calls for greater market transparency’, 24 June 2019). Conversely the return of 550,000 tonnes of EU27 white sugar on to the EU27 market could exert a price depressing effect on EU sugar prices which are only now showing signs of recovery. This would then harm the earnings potential of ACP sugar exports to EU27 markets, depending on the contractual arrangements which will have been set in place to cover sales in the 2019/20 marketing year or whether ACP sugar exporter chose to play the sugar spot market during this period of uncertainty.

Similarly if the UK leaves the EU without bilaterally negotiated TRQs for bananas being apportioned between the EU27 and UK market this could increase competition on EU27 banana markets with consequent price depressing effects (although this effect will require careful evaluation).

Thus across a range of sector ACP exporters will need to be factoring in the effects of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on the markets they currently served.

Getting to Grips with Trade Administration Issues and the Functioning of Triangular Supply Chains
In terms of trade administration issues a host of EU trade administration documentation currently applicable to the import of preferred products into the UK will simply not be valid once the UK is no longer part of the EU. Some of these dimensions ACP exporters will be unable to do anything about (e.g. the UK no longer being able to use the EU REX rules of origin administration system). In other areas ACP exporters can make sure their trade administration arrangements are in order.

For example, ACP exporters will need to ensure that their existing Economic Operator Registration Identification number (EORI) is still valid once the UK has left the EU. Any EORI’s issued by a customs authority in a EU27 member state will no longer be valid for the UK, while any UK issued EORI will no longer be valid for exports to a EU27 member states. While new EORI number can be secured within 3 days and can be applied for online, ACP exporters will need to ensure these necessary steps have been taken by 31^st October if problems are not to arise.

This is particularly important since EORI numbers are the basis for the issuing of the Binding Tariff Information (BTI) decisions and Binding Origin Information decisions (BOIs), which set out the tariff to be applied to preferred imports and provide verification of the origin of the import so the preferred duty can be applied to the consignment in question. If this documentation is not in order ACP exporters could have to pay the full MFN tariff.

These and other basic trade administration issues will need to be taken up and addressed by ACP exporters.

In addition, ACP exporters could usefully seek to ensure they are qualified to attain Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status so they can have access to ‘fast-track’ customs clearance processes. This privileged treatment will take on increasing significance in the face of the increased demands and system strain under which the UK border control service is likely to be placed in the immediate post Brexit period.

Securing AEO status is a lengthy and complex process requiring sustained engagement in ensuring the integrity of the supply chain. Against this background ACP exporters should initiate a process as soon as possible to secure AEO status for the handling of their exports to the UK, as part of broader efforts to ‘Brexit proof’ their export supply chains (see accompanying epamonitoring.net article ‘Can AEO Accreditation Help Assist ACP Exporters Using Triangular Supply Chains in Overcoming Potential Brexit Related Trade Disruptions?’, 1 August 2019).

Finally for ACP exporter trading into the UK market along triangular supply chains there is a need to launch discussions with the EU and UK authorities on what cooperation arrangements can be set in place to ensure that trade in products which enjoy the same terms and conditions of duty free-quota free access to both the EU27 and UK markets can continue to flow freely along triangular supply chains.

Unfortunately the politicisation of such technical discussions through their categorisation as ‘side deals’ which reduce the economic cost to the UK of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit has made the convening of these necessary trilateral discussions more difficult.

Against this background the concerned ACP exporters should encourage their governments to hold separate but parallel discussions with the EU27 and UK authorities to establish what needs to be done on both sides of the new EU27/UK border to allow the continued smooth functioning of these triangular supply chains.

SPS and Food Safety Issues Likely to be Central to US/UK Trade Negotiations

July 25, 2019July 2, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Ensuring the UK moves away from restrictive EU SPS requirements is likely to be central to the post-Brexit US-UK trade agreement negotiations. If the UK begins to move away from EU SPS and food safety control systems in relations with the US, this could open up new opportunities for ACP exporters whose market position is coming under increasing pressure from the EU’s new Plant Health Regulation, which is likely to come into force only after the UK is no longer part of the EU Customs Union and Single Market. While the citrus sector is the most obvious area where the ACP would have an interest in initiating dialogue with the UK over the SPS import requirements to be applied in the post Brexit period, a review of the UK’s Plant Health Information Portal suggests the initiation of an dialogue on the UK’s future SPS import requirements could prove useful in a range of other areas where increasingly strict EU wide import requirements are being imposed. Read more “SPS and Food Safety Issues Likely to be Central to US/UK Trade Negotiations”

Growth in Fairtrade sales in France good news for St Lucia but shift to dual certification is a constraint

July 18, 2019July 2, 2019 epamonitoring

Summary
Fairtrade banana sales in France have grown rapidly following the ‘sourcing decisions by major supermarket chains’. St Lucian exporters are now seeking to target the French Fairtrade banana market in light of the Brexit related uncertainties. However the consumer trend towards dual certified Fairtrade/Organic bananas poses challenges for St Lucian exporters, given the absence of treatments for Black Sigatoka (black leaf streak) in wet tropical regions which are accepted by organic certifiers. This suggests the UK market will remain of considerable importance. This highlights the need for CARIFORUM leaders need to launch a political dialogue with UK on the need to retain both existing MFN banana sector tariff in the longer term and existing quota ceilings on reduced tariff access, determined on a pro-rata basis through the apportionment of existing bilaterally negotiated EU banana TRQs between the UK and EU27 market. In addressing the TRQ apportionment issue CARIFORUM leaders could usefully ally with political leaders in African banana exporting countries, who would be most severely impacted by the disruptions on EU27 markets which would follow on from any mismanagement of the apportionment of existing EU bilaterally negotiated banana TRQs. Read more “Growth in Fairtrade sales in France good news for St Lucia but shift to dual certification is a constraint”

EPA Monitoring

Category: West African EPA