Summary
While after the exceptional level of EU sugar exports in 2018, export volumes are projected to be substantially reduced in 2019 (with export levels down 50% so far), these are still projected to be above EU export volumes in 2016/17 (+73% so far). What is more on average ACP markets in 2018 took 1 in every 5 tonnes of extra-EU sugar exports, up from 1 in every 14 tonnes in 2014. West Africa is the main ACP region for EU sugar exports, with Ghana and Senegal the two most important markets. Central Africa is the second most important ACP region with Cameroon leading the way as a destination for EU sugar exports. There have been surprisingly high levels of EU sugar exports to the eastern and Southern Africa region, given this is a sugar surplus region. EU sugar exports to the Caribbean have varied with exports to Haiti dominating the trend in overall EU sugar exports. While weather events and national trade policies play a role in patterns of EU sugar exports, there are concerns that ‘no-deal’ Brexit related trade disruption could lead to a growing EU corporate focus on sub-Saharan African markets. This could well give rise to pressure form the EC on ACP governments to abandon policies which restrict EU sugar exports. Read more “EU Sugar Exports to ACP Markets Are Falling After Record Levels of EU Exports in 2018”
Category: Central African EPA
MHP Looking to Africa as Part of its On-Going Expansion Outside of Ukraine
Summary
Following its expansion into the EU the Ukrainian poultry producer MHP is looking to expand in Africa and the Middle East. This needs to be seen in the context of a projected 15% expansion of MHPs exports in 2019 and a further planned production expansion of 15% in 2019. This expanded production will need to be exported. Current Ukrainian exports are facing growing criticism from EU poultry producers because of their market effects in the EU. These criticisms are only likely to intensify in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. This could leave MHP seeking markets elsewhere, including in African countries where acquisitions are being targeted. This could then replicate the MHP practice of using locally acquired poultry processors to channel Ukrainian poultry meat on to the local market. African poultry producers and concerned African governments will need to carefully monitor the evolution of MHPs’ African investment policy. Read more “MHP Looking to Africa as Part of its On-Going Expansion Outside of Ukraine”
What Issues Arise in Relations with Developing Countries From the EU’s 2020 CAP Reform Proposals?
Summary
While the paper from Professor Mathew’s paper reviews the possible effects of specific CAP reform proposals, these cannot be assessed in isolation from the wider EU CAP related policies. This includes EU agricultural trade policies and EU SPS and food safety policies. There are inherent tensions between the quest by EU agro-food companies for new markets and African aspirations for the structural development of local agro-food sectors. Reconciling this tension in a development friendly manner will be a key challenge in addressing policy coherence issues which arise as a result of the EU’s Common Agricultural policy and associated supporting policy measures. Any attempt to get to grips with this issue will require engagement at the country and product specific level and will require full respect for the right of ACP governments’ to determine trade policy measures in all sovereignty on the basis of national structural development interests. This will de facto require the EU to respect the ‘right to development’ of ACP countries by subordinating the interpretation and application of trade agreement commitments to the structural development interests of ACP countries, as defined by the governments and concerned stakeholders in ACP countries Read more “What Issues Arise in Relations with Developing Countries From the EU’s 2020 CAP Reform Proposals?”
Impact of Yellow Vest Protests on Cameroonian Pineapple Exports Highlights Importance of Tackling UTPs along ACP-EU Supply Chains in Context of Potential ‘No-Deal Brexit’
Summary
Commercial arrangements for Cameroonian pineapple exports to France highlight the importance of business practices to burden sharing at times of trade disruptions. Massive losses for Cameroonian exporters have a risen as a result of the ‘yellow vest’ protests disrupting the delivery of exported pineapples to supermarkets, in a context of the absence of formal contractual arrangements along the supply chain. This raises important issues related to the application of the EU’s new UTP directive given the prospect for the severe disruption of ACP-UK triangular supply chains under a no-deal outcome to the ongoing EU-UK negotiations. This suggests a need for the concerned ACP governments to lobby for the accelerated implementation of the new UTP directive in the EU member states most directly involved in these triangular trade arrangements (Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany). It also suggests a need for the establishment of a special monitoring unit to trace Brexit related unfair trading practices which emerge under a no-deal Brexit scenario. However this would only be of value if ACP exporters in future insist on written contracts before entering into supply agreements with EU importers. Read more “Impact of Yellow Vest Protests on Cameroonian Pineapple Exports Highlights Importance of Tackling UTPs along ACP-EU Supply Chains in Context of Potential ‘No-Deal Brexit’”
Task Force for Rural Africa Sets Out Four Strategic Areas and Six Initiatives
Summary
The Task Force Rural Africa (TFRA) advances a series of specific recommendations and initiatives aimed at ensuring African agro-food sector development contributes fully to addressing the employment and income earning opportunities challenge faced in Africa. A critical challenge is seen as promoting an appropriate trajectory for ‘the development of the African food industry and food markets’. However this will need to address the tension between the EU’s quest for new food product markets and African aspirations for the structural development of national agro-food sectors. In some sectors this will require a critical review of current patterns of trade and investment relations (e.g. in the dairy sector). TFRA recommendation on structured policy dialogues could prove valuable in this regard. A key issue to be addressed will be the interpretation and application of existing EU-Africa trade agreement commitments, which go beyond WTO rules and undermine national trade policy sovereignty and the effectiveness of chosen policy measures. It will also need to effectively operationalize the EU’s new unfair trading practices directive as this impacts Africa-EU trade flows and support measures to strengthen the functioning of local agro-food sector supply chains. Read more “Task Force for Rural Africa Sets Out Four Strategic Areas and Six Initiatives”
EU Sugar Exports to ACP Markets Are Falling After Record Levels of EU Exports in 2018
Summary
While after the exception level of EU sugar exports in 2018, export volumes are projected to be substantially reduced in 2019 (with export levels down 50% so far), these are still projected to be above EU export volumes in 2016/17 (+73% so far). What is more on average ACP markets in 2018 took 1 in every 5 tonnes of extra-EU sugar exports, up from 1 in every 14 tonnes in 2014. West Africa is the main ACP region for EU sugar exports, with Ghana and Senegal the two most important markets. Central Africa is the second most important ACP region with Cameroon leading the way as a destination for EU sugar exports. There have been surprisingly high levels of EU sugar exports to the eastern and Southern Africa region, given this is a sugar surplus region. EU sugar exports to the Caribbean have varied with exports to Haiti dominating the trend in overall EU sugar exports. While weather events and national trade policies play a role in patterns of EU sugar exports, there are concerns that ‘no-deal’ Brexit related trade disruption could lead to a growing EU corporate focus on sub-Saharan African markets. This could well give rise to pressure form the EC on ACP governments to abandon policies which restrict EU sugar exports.
- Overview EU Sugar Exports to ACP Markets
The expansion of EU sugar production in response to the planned abolition of EU sugar production quotas saw a major expansion of EU sugar exports in 2017/18, to a total for the season of 3,353,000 tonnes (1). This expansion of exports began even before the 1st October 2017 abolition of EU national sugar production quotas. In terms of exports to ACP markets it began in 2016, while in terms of overall extra-EU exports it began in 2017.
A review of 2018 EC market access data base statistics shows that in 2017 total EU sugar exports rose 59% compared to 2016, while exports to ACP countries increased 151% compared to 2016. 2018 saw a further 49% increase in total extra-EU sugar exports and a further 24% increase in exports to ACP countries. Average annual EU sugar exports to ACP countries in 2017 and 2018 were over four times larger than the annual average for the years 2014,2015 and 2016 (550,969 tonnes compared to 136,762 tonnes) (2).
By 2018 the EU was exporting 611,244 tonnes of sugar to ACP countries, with this accounting for 18.9% of total extra-EU sugar exports, up from 6.9% in 2014. Overall, since 2014 EU sugar exports to ACP markets have increased 482.5% while overall EU sugar exports between 2014 and 2018 increased only 113%. On average in the two post quota years of 2017 and 2018 ACP countries took 1 in every 5 tonnes of sugar which the EU exported. By 2018 the EU was exporting 77% as much sugar as it was importing from ACP countries, this compares to only 5.6% in 2014, when the EU was importing almost 18 times more sugar from the ACP than the EU was exporting to ACP markets (2).
EU Sugar Export Total and to ACP Countries (tonnes)
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | % change 17-18 | |
| EU Total exports | 1,523,854 | 1,342,485 | 1,370,544 | 2,178,927 | 3,241,842 | +48.8% |
| – Sub Total ACP | 104,937 | 109,988 | 195,360 | 490,694 | 611,244 | +24.6% |
| ACP annual % change | -2.3% | +4.8% | +77.6% | +151.2% | +24.6 | |
| % share ACP of total | 6.9% | 8.2% | 143% | 22.5% | 18.9% |
Source: Extracted from EC, Market Access Data Base, https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm
- A Heavy Concentration of EU Sugar Exports in West Africa
EU sugar exports to ACP countries are heavily concentrated in West Africa, which took almost 2/3rd of total EU sugar exports to ACP markets.
By far the most important West African markets are Ghana and Senegal, taking in 2018 25.2% and 21.8% respectively of total EU sugar exports to West Africa. Between 2014 and 2018 EU sugar exports to Ghana and Senegal increasing respectively 32-fold, 9-fold (2). In the first four months of 2019 Ghana retained its leading position as a destination for EU sugar exports to West Africa. Guinea and Togo followed, taking 12.5% and 12.1% of total EU sugar exports to West Africa, on the back of a 19-fold and 25-fold increase in EU exports between 2014 and 2018. The 2014-18 also saw a 4-fold increase in sugar exports to Benin and Burkina Faso., who by 2018 were taking 8% and 7.9% of total EU sugar exports to West Africa (2).
Since 2014 Mauritania has also seen strong growth in EU sugar exports, with in 2017 Mauritania surging into the position as the leading destination for EU sugar exports, taking 41% of all exports to West Africa. However this was not sustained with export volumes falling 87% in 2018, to account for only 3.6% of total EU sugar exports to West Africa. Mali meanwhile saw a 56 fold increase in EU sugar export volumes, coming to take 4.9% of EU exports to the region in 2018, while Sierra Leone has also emerged as a growing destination market (an 8-fold increase since 2014), taking 6.6% of export to West Africa in 2018 (2).
A noticeable trend since 2014 has been the virtual disappearance of Nigeria as a destination market for EU sugar exports, with Nigeria having previously been not only the leading destination for EU sugar exports in West Africa but across the whole of the ACP.
This may well be attributable to efforts by the Nigerian government to promote domestic sugar production through more tightly controlling imports (3). This policy may also account for why between 2014 and 2018 there was a four-fold increase in EU sugar exports to Benin (2). In April 2019 Dangote Sugar claimed ‘illegal, low-quality imports’ were ‘putting pressure on its selling price’. It was claimed that ‘although Nigeria banned packaged-sugar imports to protect local industries and diversify the economy, importers take advantage of the nation’s porous borders to bring in the product’. It was reported Dangote’s sugar revenue dropped 26% in 2018, while net income fell 44% (4)
EU Sugar Exports to West Africa (tonnes) % share exports to West African region
| % share 2018 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | % share 2018 | |
| West Africa | 57,472 | 56,895 | 55,045 | 280,536 | 406,825 | ||
| Ghana | 5.55% | 3,187 | 4,586 | 9,192 | 42,441 | 102,417 | 25.2% |
| Senegal | 16.65% | 9,568 | 11,690 | 10,717 | 22,566 | 88,759 | 21.8% |
| Guinea | 4.64% | 2,668 | 1,570 | 1,679 | 7,645 | 52,175 | 12.8% |
| Togo | 3.38% | 1,940 | 12,385 | 5,282 | 19,070 | 49,401 | 12.1% |
| Benin | 13.21% | 7,593 | 10,704 | 5,541 | 17,624 | 32,687 | 8.0% |
| Burkina Faso | 16.03% | 9,215 | 4,331 | 4,706 | 6,594 | 32,110 | 7.9% |
| Sierra Leone | 5.78% | 3,324 | 3,211 | 8,193 | 21,739 | 26,822 | 6.6% |
| Mali | 0.62% | 354 | 677 | 340 | 14,508 | 19,968 | 4.9% |
| Mauritania | 0 | 0 | 1 | 45 | 115,330 | 14,518 | 3.6% |
| Niger | 6.32% | 3,634 | 4,995 | 6,182 | 9,074 | 7,317 | 1.8% |
| Liberia | 0.28% | 161 | 155 | 220 | 874, | 4,378 | 1.1% |
| Ivory Coast | 0.22% | 124 | 29 | 20 | 246 | 4,247 | 1.0% |
| Guinea Bissau | 0.002% | 1 | 71 | 67 | 239, | 2,853 | 0.7% |
| Cape Verde | 0.34% | 195 | 213 | 288 | 285 | 1,150 | 0.3% |
| Sao Tome & Principe | 4.14% | 2,379 | 2,264 | 2,573 | 1,335 | 704 | 0.2% |
| Nigeria | 23.46% | 13,483 | 13 | – | 966 | 6 | 0.001% |
Source: EC, Market Access Data Base, https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm
- Central Africa Variable Export Trends
The second most important market for EU sugar exports in the ACP was Central Africa. Cameroon was the most important market for EU sugar exports to Central Africa accounting for 60% of export to the region, down from almost 75% in 2014, following a diversification of EU export markets in the region.
EU Sugar Exports to Central Africa (tonnes) % share exports to Central African region
| % share 2018 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | % share 2018 | |
| Central Africa | 35,190 | 32,089 | 63,570 | 67,746 | 87,806 | ||
| Cameroon | 74.93% | 26,367 | 22,292 | 38,356 | 55,604 | 52,740 | 60.06% |
| Angola | 11.07% | 3,894 | 3,952 | 18,312 | 6,143 | 25,377 | 28.90% |
| Chad | 0.45% | 16 | 17 | 21 | 757 | 5,916 | 6.74% |
| Equatorial Guinea | 6.18% | 2,173 | 2,273 | 2,569 | 2,142 | 2,165 | 2.47% |
| DRC | 0.92% | 323 | 255 | 447 | 768 | 760 | 0.87% |
| Gabon | 7.65% | 2,693 | 3,135 | 3,794 | 2,277 | 618 | 0.70% |
| Congo | 0.03% | 12 | 164 | 65 | 53 | 228 | 0.26% |
| CAR | 0.10% | 35 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 0.002% |
Source: EC, Market Access Data Base, https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm
EU exports to Cameroon nevertheless doubled between 2014 and 2018. The most dramatic areas of growth in EU exports to central Africa occurred to Angola (a 6 ½ fold increase) and Chad with an increase from 16 to nearly 6,000 tonnes between 2014 and 2018. In addition from a limited base EU sugar exports to the DRC have more than doubled (2).
However EU sugar exports to other Central African markets such as Gabon and CAR have shown declines with this being most noticeable in the case of Gabon. EU sugar exports to Equatorial Guinea meanwhile have largely stagnated though be it on a variable trend (2).
- Eastern and Southern Africa: Surprising Export Growth
While given the close proximity and sugar deficit nature of these markets these patterns of EU market exports were understandable, more surprising is the expansion of EU sugar exports to Eastern and Southern Africa markets. This region, as a whole, is a surplus sugar production region. By 2018 this region was taking a total of 109,218 tonnes of EU refined sugar up from a mere 5,217 tonnes in 2014 (2).
EU Sugar Exports to Eastern and Southern Africa – ESA (tonnes) % share exports to ESA region
| % share 2018 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | % share 2018 | |
| Sub-Total ESA | 5,217 | 13,642 | 67,733 | 124,189 | 109,218 | ||
| Southern Africa | 4.93% | 257 | 4,483 | 32,023 | 36,605 | 50,621 | 46.35% |
| South Africa | 2.89% | 203 | 4,480 | 32,022 | 15,768 | 42,421 | 38.84% |
| Namibia | 0.98% | 51 | – | 1 | 10,836 | 8,194 | 7.50% |
| Mozambique | 0.06% | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0.01% |
| EAC | 1.36% | 71 | 5,255 | 5,135 | 28,883 | 44,276 | 40.54% |
| Kenya | 0.65% | 34 | 978 | 2,061 | 3,285 | 21,859 | 20.01% |
| Tanzania | 0 | 0 | 4,231 | 3,020 | 24,184 | 17,107 | 15.66% |
| Uganda | 0.06% | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1,357 | 3,732 | 3.42% |
| Rwanda | 0.21% | 11 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 1,519 | 1.39% |
| Burundi | 0.44% | 23 | 21 | 36, | 40 | 59 | 0.05% |
| other ESA (sub-Total) | 93.7% | 4,889 | 3,904 | 30,575 | 58,701 | 14,321 | 13.11% |
| Djibouti | 1.94% | 101 | 306 | 169 | 1,379 | 7,404 | 6.78% |
| Sudan | 77.63% | 4,050 | 2,383 | 30,314 | 56,822 | 4,313 | 3.95% |
| Ethiopia | 13.32% | 695 | 1,198 | 68 | 50 | 2,231 | 2.04% |
| Comoros | 0.02% | 1 | 1 | 8 | 284, | 301 | 0.28% |
| Mauritius | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 45 | 0.04% |
| Madagascar | 0.79% | 41 | 8 | 12 | 149 | 23 | 0.02% |
| Seychelles | 0.02% | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0.003% |
| Eritrea | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.0009% |
Source: EC, Market Access Data Base, https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm
By far the most important market in the eastern and Southern African region in 2018 was South Africa, which accounted for almost 39% of EU sugar exports to the 16 ESA countries to which exports currently take place. In 2018 South Africa replaced Sudan as the leading ESA destination. In 2017 Sudan had taken almost 40% of EU sugar exports to ESA countries, before declining by over 92% in 2018 (2).
This may well in part be attributable to the drought conditions in Southern Africa, neighbouring Eswatini (Swaziland) and the Sudan. However, in terms of trade with South Africa it could also be attributable to specific patterns of sugar demand from the manufacturing sector.
The other noteworthy trend is the expansion of EU sugar exports to the EAC market, in the context of the continued application of safeguard measures by Kenya under the COMESA trade agreement. between the 2014-16 period and 2017//-18 period there was a more than 10-fold increase in the average volume of EU sugar exports to the EAC region, with Kenya in 2018 taking 49% of EU sugar exports to the EAC market (2).
EU sugar exports to other ESA countries however has proved highly variable with no clear trend, but a surprising rise in EU sugar exports to Ethiopia in 2018, though be it from a low base (2).
It is noteworthy that some of the largest increases in EU exports are in countries and sub-regions where EU based sugar companies have developed partnerships or enjoy major ownership stakes in local sugar producers, most notably in the EAC and SADC EPA regions (2).
- Variable Trends in EU Exports to the Caribbean
Beyond Africa EU sugar exports to the Caribbean have increased marginally by 4.8%. This however has taken place on a highly variable trend. Exports to Haiti are a major determining factor in trends in EU sugar exports to the Caribbean ACP countries. In 2017 Haiti accounted for 60% of EU sugar exports to Caribbean ACP countries, with this falling to a mere 0.8% in 2018. Indeed the fall in EU sugar exports to the Caribbean ACP region was wholly accounted for by changes in export levels to Haiti (2).
The most consistent destination market for EU sugar exports over the past five years has been Barbados, though be it on a declining trend. Between 2014 and 2018 the volume of EU sugar exports to Barbados fell 19%, with the share of Barbados in EU sugar exports to the Caribbean ACP region falling from 74.5% in 2014 to 57.3% in 2018 (2).
Elsewhere in the Caribbean the most noticeable trend was the increase in EU sugar exports to Suriname, with these exports largely coming from the Netherlands and Belgium. In 2018 Suriname accounted for 36% of EU sugar exports to the Caribbean ACP region, up from 14% in 2014 (2).
EU Sugar Exports to Caribbean Countries (tonnes) % share exports to Caribbean ACP region
| % share 2014 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | % share 2018 | |
| Caribbean | 7,056 | 7,762 | 9,012 | 18,223 | 7,395 | ||
| Barbados | 74.50% | 5,257 | 4,828 | 4,364 | 3,406 | 4,239 | 57.3% |
| Suriname | 14.82% | 1,046 | 1,368 | 1,324 | 2,912 | 2,665 | 36.04% |
| Bahamas | 3.43% | 242 | 198 | 242 | 198 | 220 | 2.97% |
| St Lucia | 0 | 0 | 246 | 2,772 | 374 | 88 | 1.19% |
| DR | 0.07% | 5 | 34 | 38 | 55 | 67 | 0.91% |
| Haiti | 0.03% | 2 | 1 | 3 | 10,904 | 56 | 0.76% |
| St Vincent | 0.31% | 22 | 66 | 44 | 44 | 27 | 0.37% |
| Grenada | 6.96% | 484 | 621 | 225 | 330 | 22 | 0.30% |
| Jamaica | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0.09% |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0.05% |
Source: EC, Market Access Data Base, https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm
- EU Export Trends in 2019
Reduced EU production in the 2018/19 season has seen EU sugar export volumes for the 2018/19 marketing year down to just over half the level attained in 2017/18 over the same period (to 1,086,000 tonnes compared to 2,178,000). However these export volumes were still almost 73% above the levels attained during this period in 2016/17. Overall therefore EU sugar exports continue to be at enhanced levels (5).
Total EU Sugar Exports 2018/19 up to 21st April 2019 (tonnes)
| Period | 2016/17 | 2017/18 | 2018/19 |
| 1st Oct 2018to 21 April 2019 | 629,000 | 2,178,000 | 1,086,000 |
Source: EC, ‘EU Total exports – EU cumulated exports (CN 1701)’ Sugar Market situation, AGRI G 4 Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets, 25 April 2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/market-observatory/sugar/doc/market-situation_en.pdf
As the ACP Group has pointed out this has seen EU sugar suppliers taking market share away from ACP producers on regional ACP markets, compounding the earnings losses suffered as a result of substantially lower EU prices and ACP export volumes to Europe (6).
| Comment and Analysis
While EU sugar exports to West Africa have seen a more than seven-fold increase since 2014, this trend has not been replicated in Nigeria. Current efforts by the Nigerian government to develop backward linkages in the sugar sector are actively discouraging imports of refined sugar and favouring imports of raw sugar, linked to commitments from refining companies to expand local sourcing of sugar cane. This Nigerian government policy includes: · the granting of ‘a five-year tax holiday for investors in the sugar value chain’; · the imposition of ‘a 20% duty and 60% levy for imported refined sugar’; · the imposition of a ‘10% import duty and 50 % levy on imported raw sugar’, but with a special three year dispensation during which a ‘concessionary tariff of a 5% import duty and 5% levy on imported raw sugar’ is granted to refineries that signed-on to the government’s Backward Integration Program (7). This Nigerian government’s policy thus actively discourages the importation of refined sugar from regions like the EU and favours the importation of raw sugar, by refiners who have committed to local sourcing to greater local sourcing. However as USDA analysis points out Nigerian government ‘policies on sugar have not resulted in increased production’. Indeed it is held the Nigerian governments ‘backward integration programs for sugar production still remain significantly challenged, due to weak infrastructure, poor policy formulation/implementation, limited funding and insecurity’ (7). This creates a situation where according to USDA for ‘MY 2018/19 imports are forecast to remain relatively constant at 1.8 million tons’, while production continues to languish at a mere 80,000 tonnes (7). Thus while the Nigerian governments policy has systematically discriminated against refined sugar imports from the EU and encouraged imports of raw sugar, this has so far seen no significant improvement in domestic sugar production. What it has seen is a fourfold increase in EU refined sugar exports to Benin and accusations of increased smuggling of refined sugar across the Benin-Nigeria border (4). Against this background were a ‘no deal’ Brexit to lead to a displacement of EU27 sugar exports to the UK to non-EU markets (EU27 sugar exports to the UK in MY 2017/18 amounted to 550,000 tonnes of white sugar – see epamonitoring.net article, ‘First Post Production Quota Year Shows Dramatic Changes on the EU Sugar Market’, 18 February 2019). The need to find markets for this displaced sugar without further undermining EU27 sugar markets could see the EC exerting pressure on ACP governments to abandon trade policies which are seen as discriminating against EU exports. ACP governments will need to remain alert to the potential trade displacement effects of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit in the sugar sector in a context where the UK’s ‘no-deal’ Brexit temporary MFN tariff schedule would see high MFN duties applied on imports from EU27 member states, bringing this trade to a virtual standstill. This would leave EU sugar companies looking for alternative export markets equivalent to 90% of the total level of EU sugar exports to ACP markets in 2018. The expansion of EU sugar exports to Central African countries like Angola potentially has implications for the intra-African sugar trade, with Angola being a natural market for South African, Eswatini (Swazi) and Zambian exports. Indeed, the regional marketing strategy adopted by Illovo owned Zambian Sugar may account for the more limited expansion of EU sugar exports to the DRC. Indeed, given the extent of EU corporate ownership and partnership arrangements in the Eastern and Southern African sugar sector, the pan-continental marketing strategies adopted by these Europe based sugar companies could have a significant bearing on sugar trade flows. This will be complicated by a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, given the major role which the British company Associated British Foods plays in sugar production in Southern and Eastern Africa and the potential which the French sugar company Tereos has for redirecting sugar production from associated companies in Sub-Saharan Africa to serving UK markets under a ‘no-deal’ Brexit scenario, were current exports to the UK from their French operations to be disrupted. Against this background governments of ACP sugar exporting countries will need to maintain a close eye on developments around the Brexit process and the market positioning strategies adopted by EU sugar companies, to ensure national sugar sector interests are protected. While EU sugar exports to the ESA region appear to be weather related, it is unclear to what extent, having established a market presence in countries such as Namibia and Kenya; EU exporters will seek to maintain their market presence. The pressure to maintain a market presence is likely to intensify under a ‘no-deal’ Brexit scenario given the scale of the EU27 trade displacement in the sugar sector which would arise under the application of the UK’s proposed temporary MFN tariff schedule (see epamonitoring.net article, ‘The UK’s Proposed New MFN Tariff Regime: Protects ACP Interests in the Short Term But…..’, 14 March 2019). If EU sugar exporters seek to maintain their market presence this will reduce intra-regional trade opportunities for Eswatini (Swaziland) the traditional supplier of the Namibian market and a recent sugar exporter to Kenya. Despite long standing efforts to revitalise the domestic sugar sector, the Kenyan government continues to apply safeguard measures in the sugar sector under the COMESA agreement (see epamonitoring.net, ‘EAC Sugar Sector Continues to Seek Protection and Effective Management of Sugar Imports’, 15 November 2018). This limits the level of sugar imports allowed under the COMESA agreement. However according to the USDA the top 5 sugar suppliers to the Kenyan market are: Brazil (377,349 tonnes – 48%); Thailand (111,065 tonnes – 14%); Egypt (a COMESA member 87,059 tonnes – 11%); India (84,817 tonnes – 11%); and Mauritius (a COMESA member, 78,463 – 10%). COMESA members thus account for only 21% of Kenyan imports from the top five sources of supply (8). In addition despite these import restrictions under the COMESA agreement imports from the EU have grown rapidly since 2014 (2). This raises questions about the consistency of such imports with the extension of the special sugar sector safeguards under the COMESA agreement. This being noted the EU remains a minor player as a supplier of sugar to the Kenyan market, with EU exports consisting exclusively of refined sugar. While these COMESA safeguard measures would appear to have a bearing on Swazi sugar exports to the Kenyan market, which totalled 66,475 tonnes in MY 2017/18, a more important factor was the lapsing of the special dispensation which Eswatini (Swaziland)was able to avail itself of under COMESA trade arrangements while still a member of the SACU. Given the failure of SACU to acceded to the COMESA trade protocol this special dispensation for Eswatini’s sugar exports lapsed during the MY 2018/19. This saw total Eswatini sugar exports to Kenya fall to 10,687 tonnes, a reduction of 84% (9). Given efforts underway to create a pan-African Continental FTA, the issue of the impact of EU sugar exports to Sub-Saharan Africa on the development of intra-regional trade in sugar is only likely to gain in prominence. This will be particularly the case as production levels recover from recent drought affected levels in countries like Eswatini and South Africa. |
New EU Plant Health Regulation on Non-European Fruit Fly Could Put Squeeze on Smaller ACP Mango Exporters
Summary
In the mango sector stricter EU phytosanitary controls on non-European fruit fly (Tephritidae) could halt the strong growth in ACP mango exports to the EU market which has been underway since 2008. Stricter EU controls could make it commercially non-viable for smaller scale ACP exporters to continue to enjoy entry to the EU market. In this context the extent to which the UK will apply evolving EU phytosanitary controls under a no-deal Brexit scenario could take on some significance for smaller scale ACP mango exporters. Put simply risk assessments based solely on agro-climatic conditions in the UK may come to quite different conclusions than risk assessments based on the diverse agro-climatic conditions across all EU27 member states. In this context if the UK were to design phytosanitary controls based solely on the threat to agriculture and human health in the UK these may prove to be far less strict than the controls now being introduced by the EU. This is an issue which could usefully be taken up in ongoing Continuity Agreement negotiations with the UK, particularly in the context of the “Annex of Concerns” approach now being canvassed as a mean of ensure forward looking trade arrangements with the UK are set in place. Trade arrangements which take into account the changed economic realities and commercial possibilities which the UK’s withdrawal from the EU customs union and single market will or could bring about. Read more “New EU Plant Health Regulation on Non-European Fruit Fly Could Put Squeeze on Smaller ACP Mango Exporters”
EU Council Agrees Article 50 ‘Flextension’ Until 31st October 2019
Summary
The EU Council has agreed an extension of the Article 50 process until 31st October 2019. The UK will be bound by the same rights and obligations as other EU members during this period. This extension period could come to an end earlier if the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified. In this context while there is now time to find a negotiated position this would require: ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement; revising the UK’s whole Brexit strategy or revoking Article 50. This will hinge solely around political developments in the UK. The prospect of a ‘no-deal Brexit’ remains, with critical decision points relating to the conduct of European Parliament elections in the UK, and the June 21st EU Council review of the Brexit process. In addition a ‘no-deal Brexit’ or a ‘hard Brexit’ could still occur on the 31st October 2019. Against this background ACP EPA signatories will still need to retain the option of signing Continuity Agreements with the UK if a ‘no-deal Brexit’ looks imminent. Even under a ‘hard Brexit’ ACP governments would need to address the range of issues identified as requiring the inclusion of a detailed “Annex of Concerns” in each of the concluded Continuity Agreements. This will be vital to ensuring both a smooth transition to post-Brexit trade relations with the UK and the future value to ACP exporters of the rolled over tariff preferences which Continuity Agreements seek to enshrine in ‘UK only’ trade agreements with ACP countries. Read more “EU Council Agrees Article 50 ‘Flextension’ Until 31st October 2019”
Pressure Mounts on Cameroon, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire to Sign UK Continuity Agreements to Protect Banana Exporters
Summary
Ecuador, Colombia and Peru are set to sign a Continuity Agreements with the UK, thereby ensuring continued reduced duty access to the UK market for their banana exporters. These Andean Pact countries accounted for 43.6% of UK banana imports and alongside the Continuity Agreement concluded with CARIFORUM countries ensures a continuation of current terms and conditions for banana imports which, in 2017 accounted for almost 64% of total UK banana extra-EU imports. This increases pressure on Ghana, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire to speedily conclude Continuity Agreements with the UK in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Any imposition of UK MFN tariffs would undermine the commercial position of African banana exporters, de facto amounting to a 15.4% import tax on bananas from the main African exporting countries. Read more “Pressure Mounts on Cameroon, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire to Sign UK Continuity Agreements to Protect Banana Exporters”
Which ACP EPA Signatory Countries Would be Most Vulnerable to a 12th April No Deal Brexit?
Summary
With the ending of the two year notification period set out under Article 50 of the EU Treaty and the House of Commons having rejected the Withdrawal Agreement for a 3rd time, the Brexit process is on borrowed time. The UK government will now have to submit an alternative way forward in the Brexit process if a no deal Brexit is to be avoided on the 12th April 2019. While this may include a longer extension of the Article 50 period beyond the 2 weeks the EU Council has currently granted, the prospect of a no-deal Brexit on 12th April cannot be ruled out, despite a huge 240 Parliamentary majority against the UK leaving the EU without a deal. Against this background, after providing an update on the Brexit process in the UK, this article reviews the situation of ACP countries and regions which currently trade with the UK under an EU EPA. Read more “Which ACP EPA Signatory Countries Would be Most Vulnerable to a 12th April No Deal Brexit?”