Summary
EU/UK technical discussions on solutions which could facilitate agri-food sector trade between the mainland UK and Northern Ireland, within the framework of the mutually agreed Northern Ireland protocol, could offer hope for solutions to the wider challenges now faced along ACP triangular supply chains. However, any progress on these technical issues would leave unaddressed the issue of the MFN tariffs now levied on ACP exports to final markets where the shipment arrangements require these goods to cross and EU/UK border outside of customs supervision. This issue needs to be addressed unilaterally by the UK through the adoption of practical trade documentation requirements if the commitments to continuity in market access for ACP exports is to be fully upheld. Parallel unilateral action is also required from the EU.
Press reports suggest the EU and UK may be on the verge of progress in substantive technical consultations on how best to effectively facilitate the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol so as to remove frictions in agri-food sector trade.
However, as a UK Prime Ministerial spokesperson noted, despite the constructive nature of the discussions there are ‘still significant differences that need to be resolved’. EC representatives for their part have emphasised how ‘while progress has been made on Northern Ireland, efforts did not involve removing checks on goods but instead were being concentrated on removing the series of “rolling deadlines” from the implementation of border controls’ (1)
This focus on removing ‘rolling deadlines can be seen as part of a confidence building exercise, following unilateral action by the UK government to extend the ‘grace period’ on checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from the UK. A measure which has seen trade diverted from UK to Republic of Ireland shipping routes to Scotland-Northern Ireland shipping routes (2). This has exacerbated fears that the UK’s failure to comply with agreed mainland UK-Northern Ireland border controls could lead to an expansion of smuggling operation into the EU.
With regard to ‘rolling milestones one option under discussion is a new series of agreed milestones to be achieved involving agreement with business and civil society before each stage of the protocol is implemented (1). The idea is that progress should be led by ‘data not dates’ as is the case in regard to easing of Covid-19 lockdowns. This is clearly an attempt to find common ground in building a way forward in addressing the practical issues arising as a result of the commitments made in the mutually agreed Northern Ireland protocol.
This followed calls from the EU representative in Northern Ireland João Vale de Almeida for the adoption of a constructive approach on all sides which focussed on finding solutions to the current problems ‘within the limits of the protocol that we have agreed not long ago’ (3). He stressed how the EU was ‘fully committed in a constructive way to find solutions for those problems’, but it needed to be accepted solutions would need to come from ‘implementing the protocol, implementing it fully, implementing it well’ (3).
Some evolution of the UK position appears to be underway, with, despite serious street violence in Northern Ireland, the UK Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis, clearly telling Northern Ireland politicians the Northern Ireland protocol ‘would not be scrapped’ (1).
The UK government also appears to be back peddling on its unilateral action in extending the ‘grace period’ on controls on mainland UK-Northern Ireland trade. A UK government spokesperson claimed the legal dispute now pending with the EU ‘was a result of an unfortunate mismatch in the communications last month’ (1). This is being seen as reflecting a new urgency in the UK to sort out the situation in regard to the Northern Ireland protocol in order to de-escalate tensions in Northern Ireland, which are being seen as putting the union of Great Britain in peril (4).
However, it is recognised that ‘any deal centring on the protocol will not address loyalist protests’, over the introduction of de facto border checks on goods crossing the Irish Sea. Such trade checks are seen as ‘an assault on Northern Ireland’s place in the union of the UK’ (1). It is against this background that the likelihood of the avenues identified for making progress on issues of concern need to be seen.
The EU is reportedly making the case that ‘90% of border checks could disappear if Britain agreed to align food standards’ with those of the EU. Speaking to the BBC Ireland’s Europe minister, Thomas Byrne, argued it would be ‘excellent if a veterinary deal could be achieved as it would solve problems both in Northern Ireland and those facing food exporters in Great Britain.’ However, it was recognised this was a ‘delicate’ issue. Indeed, in some quarters an agri-food sector agreement is seen as unlikely since this would de facto ‘represent a complete U-turn for the UK, which opposed regulatory alignment to achieve a hard Brexit’ (3). It is against this background that proposals have been made for the adoption of ‘an agreement along the lines of that operating for Australia and New Zealand agri-food trade.’ This would appear to be an issue of the presentation of any technical agreements which are potentially in reach.
Clearly if effective IT solutions for the electronic transmission of documentation and tracing of goods movements can be set in place, this would lower the visibility of border controls which are such a sensitive issue on the loyalist side of the political divide in Northern Ireland. If these technical solutions can also be applied to the movement of agri-food products between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, this would address EU concerns over maintaining the integrity of the EU customs union and single market.
This needs to be seen in the context of discussions in the Northern Ireland Assembly revealing permanent infrastructure for the conduct of border controls on goods crossing from the mainland UK to Northern Ireland will not be in place before 2023. Initial plans were for such permanent facilities to be in place by June 2020. However, the permanent secretary at the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) has indicated a review of requirements and the design of facilities in light of the ‘potential volume of checks… may eventually be needed.’ This may push back the approval of the necessary infrastructure investment plans until October 2021. Further delays are then possible since the Northern Ireland Executive would need to give its approval to the plans. This needs to be seen in a context where work on the full-time facilities and staffing arrangements has been halted by the Northern Ireland Executive (5).
These delays in infrastructure investments and staffing for the Northern Ireland controls need to be seen in light of the UK having rejected in June 2020, the EU offer of a further two-year extension to the transition period (a development for which provision was made in the mutually agreed Withdrawal Agreement). This UK rejection was driven by the political imperative placed centre stage by Prime Minister Johnson to ‘Get Brexit Done’. A two-year extension of the transition period had negotiations then been speedily concluded, would have allowed time for all operational details to be hammered out and the investments in infrastructure, staffing and new IT systems to be made to allow the efficient application of all dimensions of the new trade arrangements (including those required under the Northern Ireland protocol).
It is on this basis the EC representative in Northern Ireland Vale de Almeida has stressed how ‘Britain needed to own the Brexit it got, including the protocol, as it was a result of the government’s decision to go for a hard Brexit putting sovereignty ahead of collaboration on trade.’ It was pointed out how the current situation faced was a consequence of the ‘impact of Brexit, which was decided by the British people’, notably ‘the impact of the departure from the single market, which was decided on the British side as well’ (3).
In in this wider context that concerned agri-food sector enterprises are ‘urging the EU and UK to take a pragmatic approach by extending the categories of goods deemed not at risk of crossing into the Republic of Ireland to include food’ (1).
| Comment and Analysis
The scope for technical solutions to easing the movement of agri-food products between the UK and both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, could offer hope for addressing issues arising around border controls, which have increased the costs of moving ACP products onward from the UK to the Republic of Ireland. These sources of cost increases include: • The additional internal business administration costs related to export pre- • The additional customs intermediary costs arising from the need to complete • The costs of re-issuing phytosanitary certificates on ACP horticultural • Higher road haulage costs resulting from the virtual abandonment of low cost • Delivery delays and associated value losses (or even contract losses), arising However, this would still leave outstanding the rules of origin/MFN tariff issue, which is seeing ACP goods onward shipped from the UK to the Republic of Ireland outside of customs supervision facing standard EU MFN tariffs as a result of the loss of initial originating status and the creation of de facto ‘stateless goods’ when onward traded across an EU/UK border. The concerned ACP exporters and governments should keep a close eye on the development of these ‘technical discussions’, to ensure that the concerns of traders handling the onward shipment of ACP products are fully accommodated. Potentially if solutions can be found which address ACP needs in mainland UK to Republic of Ireland trade, these solutions could be extended to all ACP triangular supply chains in addressing some of the important areas of increased costs faced as a result of the Brexit process.
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Sources:
(1) Guardian, ‘UK and EU edge closer to deal on Brexit checks in Northern Ireland’, 12 April 2021
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/apr/12/uk-eu-technical-talks-brexit-northern-ireland
(2) Sky News, ‘How Brexit has changed trade between Britain and Ireland’, 18 March 2021
https://www.fpcfreshtalkdaily.co.uk/single-post/how-brexit-has-changed-trade-between-britain-and-ireland
(3) Guardian, ‘Northern Ireland protocol critics have no alternative, says EU ambassador’, 6 April 2021
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/apr/06/northern-ireland-protocol-critics-have-no-alternative-says-eu-ambassador
(4) Guardian, ‘Union in peril as PM ‘speaks for England alone’, former civil servant warns’, 12 April 2021
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/apr/12/union-in-peril-as-pm-speaks-for-england-alone-former-civil-servant-warns
(5) BBC, ‘Irish Sea border posts ‘delayed by two years’, 15 April 2021
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-56760658