Summary
Commercial arrangements for Cameroonian pineapple exports to France highlight the importance of business practices to burden sharing at times of trade disruptions. Massive losses for Cameroonian exporters have a risen as a result of the ‘yellow vest’ protests disrupting the delivery of exported pineapples to supermarkets, in a context of the absence of formal contractual arrangements along the supply chain. This raises important issues related to the application of the EU’s new UTP directive given the prospect for the severe disruption of ACP-UK triangular supply chains under a no-deal outcome to the ongoing EU-UK negotiations. This suggests a need for the concerned ACP governments to lobby for the accelerated implementation of the new UTP directive in the EU member states most directly involved in these triangular trade arrangements (Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany). It also suggests a need for the establishment of a special monitoring unit to trace Brexit related unfair trading practices which emerge under a no-deal Brexit scenario. However this would only be of value if ACP exporters in future insist on written contracts before entering into supply agreements with EU importers. Read more “Impact of Yellow Vest Protests on Cameroonian Pineapple Exports Highlights Importance of Tackling UTPs along ACP-EU Supply Chains in Context of Potential ‘No-Deal Brexit’”
Category: CAP
New EU Market Observatory for Certain Fruit and Vegetables Launched
Summary
The EC has established a new fruit and vegetable market observatory. The value of this market observatory for ACP producers crucially hinges around the product coverage and the level of detail provided through the activities of the observatories. If it is to be of value to ACP producers the fruit and vegetable market observatory needs to cover products of particular interest to ACP producers (e.g. onions) and regularly provide data on EU exports to all ACP countries in products which are of concern to ACP producers. This is essential given the disparity in size between EU production and the size of most ACP economies, where even small export volumes in EU terms can have serious market disturbance effects in individual ACP countries. The work of the market observatory in the citrus sector could help ease some of the pressure from EU producer interests for the stricter application of EU SPS controls, given the unjustified allegations of market domestic citrus market crisis in Spain. Read more “New EU Market Observatory for Certain Fruit and Vegetables Launched”
Trends in the EU Rice Market and the Potential Impact of Brexit on ACP Rice Exports
Summary
While 6 ACP countries export rice to the EU, this trade is wholly dominated by Guyana and Suriname. The unit value of Guyanese and Surinamese rice exports to the EU has fallen 23% and 30% respectively between 2012 and 2017. This needs to be seen in the context of the granting of fully duty free-quota free access to LDC rice exporters from 2009 and the reduction of the EU intervention price for rice and shift over to direct aid payments to EU rice producers in 2013. Despite the price decline Guyana exported 31% more rice to the EU market in 2017 than 2007. Up to 2030 EU rice imports are projected to increase 16.7%, although this does not factor in the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The UK takes 22.7% of total EU rice imports and 12.4% of rice imports from ACP countries. The UK’s withdrawal would impact on the EU’s TRQ based managed trade regime for rice, since such imports would then be concentrated on EU27 markets. What is more any moves by the UK to abolish current MFN tariffs on rice given the absence of domestic UK production would greatly intensify competition from Indian and Thai rice exporters, potentially pushing Guyanese and Surinamese rice exporters entirely out of the UK market. Read more “Trends in the EU Rice Market and the Potential Impact of Brexit on ACP Rice Exports”
RFC Announces Factory Expansion and Investments in Local Milk Supplies in Nigeria Amid Slowdown in Growth EU Exports of SMP
Summary
Royal FrieslandCampina has announced a new €23 million investment in developing milk-to-dairy supply chains in Nigeria. However it is unclear how much of this €23 million is linked to factory improvements to process locally sourced milk and how much targets the processing of imported milk powders. A revival of SMP prices to the December 2013 highs would appear necessary to provide a commercially significant stimulus to local milk production in Nigeria. This is likely to require the removal of production distorting EU farm supports, which stimulate EU milk production despite the production costs of most EU milk producers exceeding the revenue gained from milk sales. Since such an EU policy shift is highly unlikely, the Nigerian government may need to consider the introduction of a carefully manged dairy sector trade policy which links import licences to investments in the gradual expansion of local milk production serving local milk-to-dairy supply chains. This would need to be designed and implemented in close consultation with dairy sector stakeholders. However it is unclear whether the implementation of such a carefully managed trade regime would be possible in a country as large and politically complex as Nigeria. Read more “RFC Announces Factory Expansion and Investments in Local Milk Supplies in Nigeria Amid Slowdown in Growth EU Exports of SMP”
EPA Benefits for Fiji Becoming Marginal as Brexit Threatens Further Disruptions
Summary
In its analysis of the state of the EU-Fijian EPA implementation the EC skates over the evolution of relations since for large parts of this period political relations and EU development assistance programmes with Fiji were suspended following the military coup. In addition at the economic level, given the direction of EU sugar sector reforms, the value of traditional Fijian trade preferences have been progressively undermined over this period. Given the dominant role sugar plays in EU-Fijian trade this does not bode well for future trade relations. Ironically in the short term the prospect of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could open up new opportunities for Fijian sugar exports to the UK if the UK imposed standard MFN duties on sugar imports from the EU27 and the Fijian government was able to find a way of rolling over its current duty free-quota free access to the UK market from the 30th March 2019. Read more “EPA Benefits for Fiji Becoming Marginal as Brexit Threatens Further Disruptions”
EAC Sugar Sector Continues to Seek Protection and Effective Management of Sugar Imports
Summary
With sugar sector reforms again stalled Kenya has once again secured an extension of its COMESA sugar sector safeguards, despite rising sugar imports from non-COMESA sources. Tanzania is also facing problems in effectively managing sugar imports in the interests of domestic production growth. This provides the context for the ongoing expansion of EU sugar exports to sub-Saharan Africa which has been underway since 2014. These expanding EU sugar exports are not only linked to the abolition of EU sugar production quotas and the consequent removal of WTO constraints on exports but also EU systems of agricultural support both decoupled direct aid payments and voluntary coupled supports (VCS). VCS may shortly be reclassified in the WTO as a production and trade distorting form of support. These trade trends could pose challenges to African regional trade integration efforts in the agro-food sector. Challenges which will not only need to be addressed in the implementation of African regional trade integration schemes, but also in the implementation of EU EPAs and the design of future EU-Africa trade, development and economic cooperation arrangements in the context of the post-Cotonou ACP-EU negotiations.
- Stalled Reforms in Kenya Sees COMESA Safeguard Extended
Kenya has once again successfully sought from COMESA a further two year extension of its sugar safeguard measures, which will now run until February 2021 (1). Kenya has sought to repeatedly renew these safeguard measures since their introduction in 2004 (1).
The most recent request was made in a context where Kenya had imported sugar from outside of the COMESA region, after the Kenyan government ‘scrapped duty on sugar following a sharp decline in production that saw the price rise to Sh400 per two-kilogram packet’ (2). Against this background COMESA members have insisted on the establishment of a joint committee that will oversee the implementation of the safeguard measures and report back on the progress made in preparation for removing the safeguards (3).
Local Kenyan economists have insisted there is little point in extending the safeguard measures if the Kenyan government continues to avoid addressing the underlying issue of the sugar sectors lack of competitiveness. Efforts by the Kenyan government to privatise its State-owned mills, introduce an early maturing cane variety, and pay farmers based on sucrose content have all stalled (1). This leaves production costs at around $600/tonne, in a context where ‘procuring sugarcane alone accounts for 52 per cent of costs’ (4) (ISO 15 day average global sugar price 24 October 2018 equivalent to $295.02/tonne).
Unfortunately ‘all five State-owned milling firms are operating using obsolete milling machineries that drastically hamper efficiency and production capacities’ (4), making them a less than attractive proposition for private investors. Competition from privately owned mills meanwhile is gobbling up what little locally produced sugar cane is available. According to analysts ‘perennial delays in payments to farmers for cane delivered, coupled with low producer prices of cane between Sh 3,500 and Sh 4,500 per tonne enormously eroded farmers’ confidence in the crop, as many turned to alternative products’ (4).
The Kenyan sugar sector is further plagued by ‘weak legislation governing the sub-sector’. This has been exploited by sugar importing cartels, with it being reported that by the end of the financial year ‘more than 800,000 tonnes was imported (4).
Following the COMESA decision Kenya’s Trade Principal Secretary Dr. Chris Kiptoo acknowledged ‘it is very unlikely that the sector would have implemented the conditions set by Comesa at the end of the two years because of the structural problems facing the sugar millers’ (3).
- Import Management Problems in Tanzania
Meanwhile in neighbouring Tanzania pressure is mounting on the government to take stronger action to curb illegal sugar imports, with local producers claiming they are ‘struggling to sell their own stockpiles’ in the face of illegal imports. The Chair of the Tanzanian Sugar Producers Association (TSPA) Ashwin Rana said in the face of accumulated stockpiles of imported sugar local producers ‘will find it difficult to sell the 348,989 tonne sugar harvest scheduled for the 2018/19 season. It was maintained that some traders were exploiting the lower duty for ‘industrial sugar’ to import sugar which was then sold as direct consumption sugar to consumers. Tanzania has a major shortfall in sugar production with a domestic direct consumption demand of 630,000 tonnes and an industrial sugar demand of 145,000 tonnes (4).
This situation in the EAC sugar sector provides the background to expanding levels of EU sugar exports.
- Expanding EU Sugar Exports to Africa and Beyond
The EC reported that by the 18th September 2018 total extra-EU sugar exports had reached 3,220,000 tonnes, a level above earlier projections with almost two weeks left to run until the end of the 2017/18 season. This increase took EU exports to levels 149% above the 5 year average (6).
This expansion in EU export volumes has occurred despite the almost 50% decline in global sugar prices between October 2016 and August 2018. The EC notes ‘the excess supply has put severe pressure on world prices, which have fallen steadily over the last two years from a peak of EUR 540/t in October 2016 to EUR 274/t in August 2018, the lowest level since 2007’(6). A number of analyst however have noted the unique contribution the EU is making to this situation of excess supply on world markets, given the combined effects of its expansion in export volumes and reduction in import demand on what is a residual market.
Table: EU Sugar Exports to Main Sub-Saharan Africa Destination markets first 9 months 2017/18 Season
| Total EU Sugar Exports 9 months 2017/18 season: 2.710,000 tonnes | ||||
| Country | Tonnes | Country | Tonnes | |
| West Africa | Southern & Eastern Africa | |||
| Mauritania | 109,225.0 | South Africa | 40,450.9 | |
| Ghana | 66,913.7 | Tanzania | 34,342.4 | |
| Senegal | 50,716,.6 | Sudan | 36,498.7 | |
| Cameroon | 48,814.3 | – Sub-Total | 111,292 | |
| Guinea | 37,217.5 | Total Main SSA Destinations | 465,168 | |
| Togo | 40,988.9 | Total Extra-EU | 2,710,000 | |
| – Sub-Total | 353,876 | % share Main SSA Destinations | 17.16% | |
It is against this background that some 9 African countries were among the top 24 destinations for EU sugar exports in marketing year 2017/18 season, with smaller volume also being exported to other ACP destinations. Nine months into the season these destination were taking around 500,000 tonnes of EU white sugar exports, with exports for the whole of the season likely to be substantially in excess of this level. In the first 9 months of the 2017/18 season the EU exported 3 times more sugar to sub-Saharan African markets than in the whole of the 2016/17 season.
While West African countries were the main destinations for these EU sugar exports, growing volumes also went to the sugar surplus region of Southern and Eastern Africa (5). The leading origins for these EU sugar exports were Belgium and France which accounted for around 59% of total EU sugar exports in the 2017/18 season, with Poland someway behind with around 16%, followed much further behind by Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Marginal sugar export volumes also took place from 16 other EU member states (around 3% of the total) (5).
This needs to be seen against the background of the most recent trends in EU sugar exports to these top 9 Sub-Saharan African countries. Between 2013 and 2017 an almost 9-fold increase in EU sugar exports occurred (+319,817 tonnes).
EU sugar exports to top 9 Sub-Saharan African countries 2013-2017 (tonnes)
| 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | |
| Mauritania | 62 | – | 1 | 45 | 118,330 |
| Ghana | 2,178 | 3,187 | 4,586 | 9,192 | 42,441 |
| Senegal | 18,825 | 9,568 | 11,690 | 10,717 | 22,054 |
| Guinea | 1,907 | 2,668 | 1,570 | 1,679 | 7,649 |
| Togo | 2,947 | 1,940 | 12,385 | 5,282 | 19,070 |
| Cameroon | 14,735 | 26,368 | 22,292 | 38,356 | 54,524 |
| South Africa | 249 | 203 | 4,480 | 30,822 | 15,768 |
| Tanzania | 48 | – | 4,231 | 3,020 | 24,184 |
| Sudan | 74 | 4,050 | 2,383 | 30,314 | 56,822 |
| – Sub-Total | 41,025 | 47,985 | 63,618 | 129,428 | 360,842 |
Source: EC Market Access Data Base
This forms part of a broader picture of expansion of EU sugar exports across African regions.
Trends in Extra EU Sugar exports to Sub-Saharan Africa by region and total extra-EU Sugar exports (tonnes)
| 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | +% 2013-17 | |||
| Total West Africa | 63,853 | 55,754 | 54,949 | 52,842 | 280,913 | +339.9% | ||
| Total Central Africa | 30,303 | 35,515 | 32,090 | 63,598 | 64,613 | +113.2% | ||
| Total Eastern Africa | 870 | 4,862 | 7,782 | 35,547 | 89,144 | +10,146% | ||
| Total Southern Africa | 261 | 257 | 4,483 | 30,823 | 26,605 | 10,093.5% | ||
| Total Sub-Saharan Africa | 95,287 | 96,388 | 99,304 | 182,810 | 461,275 | +384% | ||
| Total Extra-EU | 1,411,291 | 1,523,870 | 1,322,704 | 1,369,367 | 2,178,337 | +54.4% | ||
| % share Sub-Saharan Africa | 6.7% | 6.3% | 7.5% | 13.3% | 21.2% | |||
| West Africa: Mauritania, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Benin, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Liberia, Gambia, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau Central Africa: Cameroon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, ,Gabon, Chad, DRC, Congo, CAR Eastern Africa: Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Comoros, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Mauritius, Eritrea Southern Africa: South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique |
||||||||
Source: EC Market Access Data Base
| Comment and Analysis The long standing problems faced in the Kenyan sugar sector highlight the profound problems faced in not only promoting competitive sugar production in sectors which have traditionally been protected but also the problems faced in fostering regional free trade in sensitive agricultural products such as sugar. The issues faced in Kenya are not only technical linked to mill management, cane varieties and payments systems but increasingly political given the geographical distribution of sugar production, the politicisation of ethnicity within the electoral process and subsequent de-centralisation of government decision making to provincial authorities.From a trade policy perspective however what is of most concern is the inability of the Kenyan government to effectively manage its nominal trade policy and harness it to the process of necessary production restructuring. The problem of managing trade in sensitive products such as sugar is also apparent in Tanzania. Without an effective capacity to manage trade flows, structured and managed moves towards regional trade integration are likely to be held back and disrupted. This provides the context in East Africa to the dramatic increase in EU sugar exports which is underway.The almost 9-fold expansion in EU sugar exports to sub-Saharan African countries which occurred between 2013 and 2017 needs to be seen in a context where sub-Saharan Africa is a net sugar surplus continent. This also needs to be seen against the background of the intensification of efforts to create both regional free trade areas and a pan-continental free trade area. The danger exists that the growing volume of EU sugar exports (and high sugar content food products) could complicate this process of regional trade integration in the African sugar sector. This could get particularly complicated when the global corporate strategies of EU sugar companies, which have invested in sub-Saharan African sugar production since 2004, are taken into account. These strategies seek to position the companies concerned so as to have a diversified source of sugar production to meet rising demand in Asian markets, with value added processing commonly taking place in Europe not at the point of production. By the end of the 2017/18 season the EU will be once again exporting substantially more sugar to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (including destinations outside the top 24 markets) than it imports from Sub-Saharan Africa. While by 18 September in the 2017/2018 season some 521,000 tonnes of sugar had been imported from ACP/EBA countries (excluding South Africa), some 49% of these imports came from non-African ACP countries, namely Belize (27%), Fiji (13%) and Guyana (9%). This rapid expansion of EU sugar export has occurred despite the collapse of global sugar prices and the greater inherent efficiency of production of sugar from sugar cane compared to production of sugar from sugar beet. In this context it should be recalled EU production levels and trade outcomes cannot be divorced from the deployment of EU agricultural support payments, notably the underlying system of decoupled direct aid payments which makes a major contribution to farm incomes and since the abolition of EU sugar production quotas the maintenance of voluntary coupled support payments for sugar producers in member states where the production of sugar beet is less competitive (see companion epamonitoring.net article ‘The June 2018 CAP Reforms: Part 2 – Importance of CAP Instruments to EU Agriculture and Issues Arising for the ACP’, 13 September 2018). This has led to a situation where production has increased in more efficient sugar production zones of the EU but with no corresponding decline in sugar beet production in the less competitive production zones of the EU. It was this that resulted in record EU sugar production in the 2016/17 season (see companion epamonitoring.net article ‘Sugar Substitution Gaining Pace in EU Amid Falling EU Import Demand’, 5 November 2018). African governments individually and collectively will need to explore just how they are to manage the trade distortions which arise as a result of EU agricultural support policies in the sugar sector as they seek to promote closer intra-African market integration as part of the AfCFTA process. A major problem faced in this regard is that these distortions are so deeply entrenched within the EU agricultural production system that they are not commonly mistaken for the simple operation of market forces. This is likely to mean that any African efforts to address the sugar sector trade distortions will meet with strong resistance from the European Commission and EU member states, all of which are looking to use the economic partnership agreements and the post-Cotonou EU agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to more effectively promote EU trade and investment interests (for details of recent EU initiatives in this regard, specifically the ‘new Africa-EU alliance for sustainable investment and jobs’ initiative, see companion epamonitoring.net article ‘EU Sees Mauritania’s EPA signature as Stepping Stone to an EU-Africa FTA?’, 25 October 2018). This is going to throw up complex challenges for African governments not only in their relations with the EU but also in their relations with each other as they seek to operationalise their commitments to the creation of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), not only in the sugar sector but across a multiplicity of sensitive sectors. |
Sources
(1) People Daily, ‘Sugar safeguards dilemma’, 17 July 2018
http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/451555/sugar-safeguards-dilemma/
(2) Business Daily , ‘Kenya seeks fresh Comesa sugar import safeguard’, 13 July 2018
https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13264-kenya-seeks-fresh-comesa-sugar-import-safeguard.html
(3) buisnesdailyafrica.com, ‘Relief for Kenya as Comesa team endorses sugar import safeguard’, 16 July 2018
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/commodities/Comesa-team-endorses-sugar-import-safeguard-Kenya/3815530-4665714-w7mueo/index.html
(4) IPPmedia, ‘Govt urged to get tougher over illegal sugar imports’ 13 July 2018
https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/govt-urged-get-tougher-over-illegal-sugar-imports
(5) EC, ‘Sugar Market situation’, AGRI G 4 Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets, 27 September 2018
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/market-observatory/sugar/doc/market-situation_en.pdf
(6) EC, ‘Short-term outlook for EU agricultural markets in 2018 and 2019’, Autumn 2018
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/short-term-outlook-autumn-2018_en.pdf
Calls for Stricter EU Measures Against UTPs
Summary
EU regulations to combat unfair trading practices along agro-food supply chains, including within 3rd country supply chains serving the EU market continue to make progress through the legislative process. It is estimated EU farmers lose some €11 billion because ‘retail chains change contracts after they’ve been agreed upon or cancel orders at short notice’. ACP exporters also suffer from UTPs particularly last minute cancellations of orders and retroactive changes to agreed sales arrangements. The financial consequences of the UTPs can be quite severe, so operationalising the new UTP regulation as it applies to ACP-EU supply chain could lead to immediate improvements in the financial returns to ACP producers, particularly smallholder horticulture producers. This issue could potentially be taken up in the context of the forthcoming ACP-EU post-Cotonou negotiations. This can be seen as an urgent issue since a ‘no-deal’ Brexit could disrupt triangular horticulture supply chains, with any resulting losses being passed down to primary producers in Africa and other ACP regions. Read more “Calls for Stricter EU Measures Against UTPs”
The June 2018 CAP Reform: Part 4 CAP and Policy Coherence for Development
Summary
As part of the proposals for the revision of the EU’s common agricultural policy, the EC has released a substantive staff working paper which seeks to assess the impact of the European Commission proposals. Annex 5 of the EC Staff Working Paper which reviews the ‘Results of Quantitative and Multi-Criteria Analysis’ includes a section on ‘policy coherence’. This provides insights into the EC’s approach to addressing policy coherence for developments issues. It is noteworthy that policy coherence for development is only one dimension of the EU’s policy coherence agenda which need to be taken on board in the design and implementation of the CAP, and as such may not be accorded a high priority. While asserting the consistency of the CAP with EU development policy objectives the EU implicitly acknowledged the trade distorting nature of ‘coupled’ direct aid payments. This suggests a need for specific measures to avoid any adverse effects on developing countries in sector where sugar and dairy sectors are important or sector development programmes are under implementation. This is likely to require a flexible and responsible interpretation and enforcement of EPA commitments on the use of non-tariff trade measures by ACP governments. A commitment in this regard should be enshrined in ‘Right to Development’ provisions under future EU partnership agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Read more “The June 2018 CAP Reform: Part 4 CAP and Policy Coherence for Development”
The June 2018 CAP Reforms: Part 3 the Trade Dimensions of the CAP and the ACP
Summary
In the background documentation to its CAP reform proposals the EC highlights the growing international focus of the EU agro-food sector and hence the importance of securing preferential trade access for EU agro-food exports to 3rd country markets where food demand is growing rapidly. This includes securing the preferential removal of not only tariffs on EU exports but also the removal of non-tariff barriers to EU agro-food exports. The EC analysis highlights just how central EU trade policy is to the implementation of the CAP and the achievement of overall EU policy objectives for the agricultural sector. In an ACP-EU context this suggests the issue of the interpretation and implementation of EPA commitments is likely to take on growing importance in the coming years. This needs to be seen in a context where EU policy prescriptions for ACP governments in sensitive agro-food sectors diverge markedly from EU policy practices in sensitive agro-food sectors. Read more “The June 2018 CAP Reforms: Part 3 the Trade Dimensions of the CAP and the ACP”
The June 2018 CAP Reforms: Part 2 – Importance of CAP Instruments to EU Agriculture and Issues Arising for the ACP
Summary
At the beginning of June 2018 the EC issued a range of documents setting out both proposals for the amendment of CAP regulations and the background to these proposals. The EC sought to outline the developments since 2013 which required further reforms to be introduced. The EC also highlighted the important role which EU agricultural support plays in enhancing farm incomes, and by implication, sustaining agricultural production. The EC also highlighted the growing importance of risk management as global price movements begin to transmit onto EU markets. The EC highlighted the desire of EU member states governments to minimise changes to support instruments and support levels. The preference of some member state governments for higher levels of coupled support could well see an expansion of the use of this instrument as more discretionary powers are devolved to EU member states. While the EC has sought to assert the non-trade distorting nature of EU agricultural support instruments, this seems to conflate the compatibility of EU support instruments with WTO rules with the absence of any trade consequences for developing country partners. Read more “The June 2018 CAP Reforms: Part 2 – Importance of CAP Instruments to EU Agriculture and Issues Arising for the ACP”